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I. INTRODUCTION
WANTED!
Contract Law's Mutuality of Obligation Doctrine
Dead or Alive!
But preferably dead, say most legal scholars. Herman Oliphant or-
dered its execution in 1928.1 His judgment has now been affirmed by
the American Law Institute, and commentators including Corbin, Oli-
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEw.
Associate Professor, South Texas College of Law. The author thanks Bruce Bur-
ton, Bruce McGovern, and A.W. Brian Simpson for helpful comments on prior
drafts. Of course, these kind colleagues are not responsible for any errors.
1. See Herman Oliphant, Mutuality of Obligation in Bilateral Contracts at Law (pts.
1 & 2), 25 CoLum. L. REV. 705 (1925), 28 CoLum. L. REv. 997 (1928). Oliphant's
influential article argued that mutuality of obligation's maxim "both should be
bound, or neither" had no use in contemporary case law and was not required by
logic or other doctrine. He allowed that the illusory promise doctrine had some
potential use, however. See Oliphant, supra, 28 COLUm. L. REV. at 1006.
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phant, Patterson, Williston, Barnett, Eisenberg, Farber & Matheson,
Gordon, Wessman, Perillo & Bender, Calamari & Perillo, Murray and
others.2 A few courts have begun to play the executioner by overrul-
ing the doctrine.3
Accordingly, I was going to write a short piece called The Death of
Mutuality of Obligation. Death of titles are in vogue.4 I was once an
apprentice mortician 5 and have always wanted to use the metaphor.
But before I began embalming mutuality of obligation, I held a mirror
2. See JOHN D. CALrmAni & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 4.12, at
201 (4th ed. 1998) ("The concept of'mutuality of obligation' has been thoroughly
discredited."); ARTHmU L. CORBIN, CoRBn ON CoNRsAcrs § 152 (one vol. ed. 1952);
JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 250 (4th ed.,
Michie Co. 1991); 2 JOSEPH M. PERILLO & HELEN HADJiYANNAIaS BENDER, CORBIN
ON Co rRAcTs § 6.1 (rev. ed. 1993) (advocating that mutuality of obligation be
abrogated); SAMUEL L. WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 115 (1921); Randy E.
Barnett, The Death of Reliance, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1996); Melvin A. Eisen-
berg, The Principles of Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 640 (1982) [hereinafter
Eisenberg, Principles]; Melvin A. Eisenberg, Probability and Chance in Contract
Law, 45 UCLA L. Rav. 1005 (1998) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Probability &
Chance]; Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel:
Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake", 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 903 (1985);
James D. Gordon I[I, Consideration and the Commercial-Gift Dichotomy, 44
VA-D. L. REv. 283 (1991) [hereinafter Gordon, Commercial-Gift]; James D.
Gordon II, A Dialogue About the Doctrine of Consideration, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
987 (1990) [hereinafter Gordon, Dialogue]; Oliphant, supra note 1; Edwin W. Pat-
terson, An Apology for Consideration, 58 COLum. L. REv. 929, 939-41 (1958); see
also Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STN. L. REV.
481, 497-99 (1996) (noting that efficient reliance put to use in contract law would
obviate the need for a mutual promise); Mark B. Wessman, Retraining the Gate-
keeper: Further Reflections on the Doctrine of Consideration, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv.
713 (1996) [hereinafter Wessman, Consideration 11; Mark B. Wessman, Should
We Fire the Gatekeeper? An Examination of the Doctrine of Consideration, 48 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 45 (1993) [hereinafter Wessman, Consideration 1].
3. See Taliento v. Portland W. Neighborhood Planning Council, 705 A.2d 696, 703(Me. 1997); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629 (Minn. 1983);
Day v. Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health Ctr., No. 8062, 1983 WL 4934 (Ohio Ct.
App. Aug. 17, 1983); Berube v. Fashion Ctr., Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1045 (Utah
1989).
4. Death of titles abound. Memorable examples include The Death of Contract (Gil-
more, of course), The Death of Reliance (Barnett), The Death of the Irreparable
Injury Rule (Laycock), The Death of Copyright (Minassian), The Death of Dis-
course (Collins & Skover), The Death of an Honorable Profession (Bogus), The
Death of Law? (Fiss-too much hyperbole here for me), The Death of Liability
(Lopucki: kudos for this title-just the right hyperbole-how could Yale L.J. re-
sist?), The Death of Common Sense (Howard), The Death of the Up-Down Distinc-
tion (Shapiro), The Death of an Author, By Himself (Tushnet), Death of a
Salesman (Miller), The Death of Ivan Ilych (Tolstoy). Some titles are less memo-
rable: The Death of Solid Waste Flow Control (Young).
5. It was a dead end job. I have now moved to graver matters. Cf note 4. Now, my
students complain that I have a stiff delivery. rm glad they get everything out on
the table. I'll try to bury my past.
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under the corpse's nose. Water condensed on the glass! The cold body
had yet breath left! How could mutuality of obligation remain vital?
The mutuality of obligation doctrine is generally stated as "both
parties must be bound to a contract, or neither is."6 The doctrine sup-
posedly requires that each party to a contract have at the time of con-
tract formation some executory, legally enforceable obligation. Of
course, this doctrine does not apply to unilateral contracts, in which
parties trade a promise for a performance, i.e., if you mow my lawn I'll
pay you $15.7 If the contract is unilateral, the contract forms when
the performance of one party is complete, when the lawn is mowed.
The party who has already performed lacks any further obligation at
the time of formation. That lack does not prevent the promising party
from being bound, however: the $15 must then be paid. The mutuality
of obligation doctrine applies not to such unilateral contracts but only
to bilateral contracts-contracts in which parties trade promises.
Courts have held a promise traded for another promise to be en-
forceable for well over 400 years, since the early to mid-1500s.8
6. See, e.g., Lopez v. Plaza Fin. Co., No. 95-C-7567, 1996 WL 210073, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 25, 1996) ("Under Illinois law, mutuality of obligation requires that either
both parties be bound, or neither be bound."); Economy Roofing & Insulating Co.
v. Zumaris, 538 N.W.2d 641, 650 (Iowa 1995) ("Mutuality of obligation requires
that unless both parties to an agreement are bound, neither is bound."); Reed v.
Citizens Ins. Co. of Am., 499 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) ("'Mutuality of
obligation' means that both parties to an agreement are bound or neither is
bound, that is, mutuality is not present where one party is bound to perform, but
not the other."); Serpa v. Darling, 810 P.2d 778, 781 (Nev. 1991) ("[Mlutuality of
obligation requires that unless both parties to a contract are bound, neither is
bound." (internal quotations omitted)).
7. Some have claimed that mutuality of obligation applies to unilateral contracts.
For example, the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF Corr~cTs § 79 (1981) treats mutu-
ality's non-applicability to unilateral contracts as an argument for abandoning
the mutuality doctrine: "Both must be bound or neither is bound." "That state-
ment is obviously erroneous as applied to an exchange of promise for perform-
ance." Id. cmt. f. The RESTATEmNr (SECOND) in this instance argues against a
straw man. Mutuality of obligation was never properly intended to apply to uni-
lateral contracts (as I demonstrate in Part H of this paper).
8. See J.H. BAKER, A INrRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 368-69 (3d ed.
1990) [hereinafter BAER, ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY]; J.H. BAKER, THE LEGAL PRO-
FESSION AND THE COASION LAw 378-83 (1986) [hereinafter BAKER, LEGAL PROFEs-
SION] (reporting cases between 1561 and the 1580s); J.H. BAKER & S.F.C.
MILSOM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 482-505 (1986) [hereinafter BAKER
& MnsoM, SOURCES] (listing various sources addressing the issue of mutual
promises between 1561 and 1580); A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAw OF Co mAcr 459-65 (1975) (noting the formulation of the doctrine before
1589); see also Strangeborough v. Warner, 4 Leon. 3, 74 Eng. Rep. 686 (IKB.
1589); West v. Stowell, 2 Leon. 154, 74 Eng. Rep. 437 (C.P. 1578), reprinted in
BAKER & MILSOM, SOURCES, supra, at 494 (Mounsen, J.) ("[iere the considera-
tion is sufficient, for here this counter promise is a reciprocal promise."); David J.
Tbbetson, Consideration and the Theory of Contract in Sixteenth Century Com-
mon Law, in TowARDS A GEEzRAL LAw OF CoNTRACT 67 (John Barton ed., 1990); 2
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Courts currently say that a mutual (or reciprocal, or bargained-for)
promise constitutes consideration for a promise, causing it to be en-
forceable. 9 I call this the mutual promise rule. The mutuality of obli-
gation doctrine-that both should be bound, or neither-augments the
mutual promise rule. The mutuality of obligation doctrine requires
that both mutual promises legally bind their promisors.1O Commenta-
tors before now have viewed the mutuality of obligation requirement
as a negative, and strong requirement-if one promise is not enforcea-
ble for any reason, the other must not be. i i This negative, strong form
of the mutuality of obligation doctrine is often stated as a corollary to
the mutual promise rule: a promise not legally binding is not
consideration.
It is this negative, strong form of the mutuality of obligation doc-
trine that commentators have condemned. They have spoken of it as
if none other form existed. Assuming that mutuality of obligation
meant only this negative, strong form doctrine, nearly every commen-
tator since Oliphant has called for its overruling.' 2 Oliphant claimed,
describing only a negative doctrine, that mutuality of obligation is not
required by "logic or theory" and serves no purpose.' 3 The Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts also proposes similarly that mutuality of
THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN 262-90 (94 Selden Society, J.H. Baker ed.
1978) [hereinafter SPELMAN'S REPORTS].
9. See cases cited supra notes 6 & 8 and infra note 64. Consideration is a bargained-
for performance or (more importantly here) promise of some performance. The
performance may be to forbear, omit, create, modify, or destroy a legal relation.
Taken in this sense, it is sometimes called "detriment" or "benefit." See RESTATE-
M NT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981) (requiring a bargained-for promise or
performance); JOHN D. CALImxu & JOSEPH M. PERIL o, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 4-2, at 187-88 (3d ed. 1987); 3 SAMUEL WILLSTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS §§ 7.3, 7.4 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 1992).
10. See ISS Int'l Serv. Sys., Inc. v. Alabama Motor Express, Inc., 686 So. 2d 1184,
1189 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) ("These agreements must be mutually binding....");
Centerville Builders, Inc. v. Wynne, 683 A.2d 1340, 1341 (R.I. 1996) ('This mutu-
ality is achieved when both parties are 'legally bound through the making of re-
ciprocal promises.'" (quoting Crellin Techs., Inc. v. Equipmentlease Corp., 18
F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1994)). This rule is commonly stated by use of the more
general phrase, "either both must be bound, or neither is bound." Hoadley v.
Hoadley, 155 N.E. 728, 730 (N.Y. 1926) (quoting Blackstone); see also cases cited
supra note 6.
11. See, e.g., PERILLO & BENDER, supra note 2, § 6.1; WILLISTON, supra note 9, § 7.13.
12. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 cmt. f (1981) (purporting to
do away with the mutuality of obligation doctrine); Henry Winthrop Ballentine,
Mutuality and Consideration, 28 HARv. L. REV. 121 (1914); Arthur L. Corbin,
Non-Binding Promises as Consideration, 26 COLUm. L. REv. 550 (1926); Oliphant,
supra note 1; SAMUEL WILLISTON, supra note 9, at 857; authorities cited supra
note 2.
13. See, e.g., Oliphant, supra note 1, 28 CoLum. L. REv. at 1012 ('[No logic is able to
connect the supposed mutuality rule with any formulation of the doctrine of con-
sideration and no other logical justification for it has ever been suggested.").
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obligation be abandoned.14 And a few courts have now overruled mu-
tuality of obligation on the ground that the doctrine is a forbidden in-
quiry into adequacy or value of consideration, because even a non-
binding promise has sufficient value to serve as consideration. 15
This paper defends the doctrine of mutuality of obligation. First,
this paper sets straight the history of mutuality of obligation. Willis-
ton taught that mutuality of obligation was created in Harrison v.
Cage,1 6 (1698), implying that the mutual promise rule had functioned
for well over 100 years without the mutuality corollary. 17 Williston
was wrong. The mutuality of obligation principle has been integral to
the mutual promise rule since the mutual promise rule was created
over 400 years ago. Only 400 year-old case law can prove this thesis,
however. Accordingly, Part I discusses case reports which first dis-
cuss the mutual promise rule. Part II.A discusses how those same
cases also establish the mutuality of obligation doctrine.
Second, this paper contends that the negative, strong form of the
mutuality of obligation doctrine is incorrect and has never been the
law. Parts II.A and II.B show that the meaning of the mutuality of
obligation doctrine in the 1500s and thereafter was uncertain. Some
judges obviously held to the negative, strong form understanding of it,
and some did not. But 400 years of litigation has (i) revealed that the
doctrine (a) does not function negatively and (b) is not a hard and fast
requirement, and (ii) clarified the doctrine's proper role. Properly un-
derstood, the mutuality of obligation doctrine is not a negative but an
affirmative principle: it says that if one party has a remedy then the
other should, too. Moreover, the doctrine is only presumptive-mu-
tual promises must presumptively bind equally. But the presumption
is weak, and a variety of showings will overcome it.
14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1981) ("If the requirement of con-
sideration is met, there is no additional requirement of 'mutuality of obliga-
tion.'"); id. cmt. f("The only requirement of 'mutuality of obligation' even in cases
of mutual promises is that stated in §§ 76-77 [dealing only with illusory
promises]."). Some courts have inferred that the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) rejects
the mutuality of obligation doctrine. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 66
F.3d 438, 451 (2d Cir. 1995); Design Benefit Plans, Inc. v. Enright, 940 F. Supp.
200, 205 (N.D. IlM. 1996); Lackey v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 498 S.E.2d 898, 905
(S.C. Ct. App. 1998).
15. See Taliento v. Portland W. Neighborhood Planning Council, 705 A.2d 696, 703
(Me. 1997); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629 (Minn. 1983);
Day v. Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health Ctr., No. 8062, 1983 WL 4934, (Ohio Ct.
App. Aug. 17, 1983); Berube v. Fashion Ctr., Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1045 (Utah
1989).
16. 5 Mod. 411, 87 Eng. Rep. 736 (1698). See infra note 104 and text accompanying
notes 136-41 for discussions of Harrison. Others have thought the doctrine a
tenet of classical contract law.
17. See Samuel Williston, The Effect of One Void Promise in a Bilateral Agreement,
25 COLUmi. L. REv. 857, 859 (1925) ("The question was first raised in 1698 in
Harrison v. Cage.").
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Third, Part II.C shows that, when the mutuality of obligation doc-
trine is understood as an affirmative presumption only, objections to it
disappear and vital roles for the doctrine appear. In particular, the
doctrine ensures that the law treats litigating parties equally. The
doctrine also serves as the connecting link between mutual promises
and the notions of contract and mutual agreement. In the end, as long
as the law retains the mutual promise rule, the law of contracts in
order to be coherent and fair in its application must retain the affirm-
ative, presumptive mutuality of obligation doctrine as a corollary.
Part III addresses the relationship between mutuality of obligation
and value. It shows that the mutuality of obligation doctrine is at root
wholly unrelated to value, contrary to the assertions of both recent
case law and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
This paper does not address three somewhat related concerns.
First, it does not discuss whether the law should retain the mutual
promise rule or the requirement of a consideration. I wish only to ex-
plicate the relationship between the mutual promise rule and the mu-
tuality of obligation doctrine.
Second, the paper does not discuss the illusory promise rule. Some
contract law scholars would have lawyers refrain from calling an illu-
sory promise a mutuality defect,1s but courts and others often do so. 19
The illusory promise rule requires that each party to a bilateral con-
tract actually promise to do or not do something. Some things com-
monly called promises do not qualify. For instance, a promise may be
so vague that no one is sure what is promised2O; a promise may be
conditioned on the promisor's whim (i.e., "I promise to perform if I
want to."21); a promisor may reserve a right to cancel any time, for any
or no reason, and without notice, in which case nothing really is prom-
ised 22; or sometimes what looks like a promise is only a statement of
18. Professor Farnsworth uses "mutuality of obligation" only to refer to a defect of
assent, not to illusory promises. See E. ALLAN FARNswoRTH, FARNSWoRTH ON
CoNTRCrAcs §§ 2.13, 3.2 (2d ed. 1998).
19. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 20-22; CAIMAmRI & PERiLLO, supra note 9, at 228.
20. See, e.g., Dasenbrock v. Interstate Restaurant Corp., 287 N.E.2d 151, 156 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1972); Garry v. Edmann Homes, Inc., 173 N.Y.S.2d 635, 637 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1958); Rosen v. W.S.M. Enter., Inc. (In re W.S.M. Enter., Inc.) 102 B.R. 461,
470 (Bankr. D. Md. 1989); see also, White v. Roche Biomedical Labs., Inc., 807 F.
Supp. 1212, 1219 (D.S.C. 1992).
21. See, e.g., Johnson Enter. of Jacksonville, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 162 F.3d 1290,
1311-12 (11th Cir. 1998); Ehre v. New York (In re Adirondack Ry. Corp.), 95 B.R.
867, 874 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) ("[Ihe State's return promise imposes no obligation on
itself since it amounts to an 'I will if I want to', rendering the settlement, as a
matter of law, anything but binding .... It is a promise in form but not in sub-
stance."); Rosenberg v. Lawrence, 541 So. 2d 1204, 1206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1988); Wickham & Burton Coal Co. v. Farmers' Lumber Co., 179 N.W. 417, 418
(Iowa 1920).
22. See, e.g., Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Orange Crush Co., 296 F. 693, 694 (5th
Cir. 1924); Jacob Schmidt Brewing Co. v. Minot Beverage Co., 93 F. Supp. 994,
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intention to perform. 23 Courts have said that these kinds of promises
and others like them are illusory-not promises to do or not do any-
thing.2 4 Courts have found certain other potentially illusory promises
not to be illusory because bolstered by implied promises or obligations
of good faith: promises conditioned on the promisor's satisfaction, 25
promises to make best efforts,26 promises to buy requirements or sell
output,2 7 and promises to serve as an exclusive dealer.28 But if the
court can not or elects not to imply a promise and the alleged recipro-
999 (D.N.D. 1950); Pick Kwik Food Stores, Inc. v. Tenser, 407 So. 2d 216, 218
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) ("If one party has the unrestricted right to terminate
the contract at any time, that party makes no promise at all and there is not
sufficient consideration for the promise of the other."); Allington Towers N., Inc.
v. Rubin, 400 So. 2d 86, 88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). Employment at will allows
both the employer and employee a right to cancel at any time, without restriction.
Promises of employment at will are therefore considered to be illusory. See, e.g.,
Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn. 1981) ("On these
facts no contract exists because due to the bilateral power of termination neither
party is committed to performance and the promises are, therefore, illusory.").
23. See, e.g., In re Adirondack Ry. Corp., 95 B.R. at 874.
24. RESTATE MNT (SECOND) OF COmMACTS § 77 (1981) records that "[a] promise or
apparent promise is not consideration if by its terms the promisor or purported
promisor reserves a choice of alternative performances unless" each performance
alone would be consideration or that one of them would and there exists a sub-
stantial possibility that the one alternative which is not consideration will be
eliminated before the promisor exercises its choice.
25. See Doubleday & Co. v. Curtis, 763 F.2d 495, 500 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[Wlhere the
satisfactory performance of one party is to be judged by another party-New
York courts have required the party terminating the contract to act in good faith
.... This principle-that a contract containing a "satisfaction clause" may be
terminated only as a result of honest dissatisfaction-would seem especially ap-
propriate in construing publishing agreements. To shield from scrutiny the al-
ready chimerical process of evaluating literary value would render the
"satisfaction" clause an illusory promise, and place authors at the unbridled
mercy of their editors."); Rohde v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 632 F.2d 667,
669 (6th Cir. 1980); Mattei v. Hopper, 330 P.2d 625, 627 (Cal. 1958); Cotten v.
Deasey, 766 S.W.2d 874, 878 (Tex. App. 1989).
26. See Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214,214 (N.Y. 1917) (Cardozo, J.)
(implying a duty to make reasonable efforts and on that basis rejecting the argu-
ment that the plaintiffhad not bound himself "to anything"); Richard Bruce & Co.
v. J. Simpson & Co., 243 N.Y.S.2d 503, 506 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963); Mezzanotte v.
Freeland, 200 S.E.2d 410, 414 (N.C. Ct. App. 1973) ("A promise conditioned upon
an event within the promisor's control is not illusory if the promisor also im-
pliedly promises to make reasonable effort to bring the event about or to use good
faith and honest judgment in determining whether or not it has in fact occurred."
(internal quotations omitted)).
27. See UCC § 2-306(1); cmt. 2 (1977) ("Under this Article, a contract for output or
requirements is not too indefinite since it is held to mean the actual good faith
output or requirements of the particular party. Nor does such a contract lack
mutuality of obligation since.., the party who will determine quantity is re-
quired to operate his plant or conduct his business in good faith and according to
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade .... "); id. cmt. 5 ("An exclusive
dealing agreement brings into play all of the good faith aspects of the output and
requirement problems .... ").
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cal promise is a promise in name but not in actuality, being illusory,
then consideration is lacking. Stated another way, an illusory prom-
ise is not consideration. 2 9 While worthy of discussion (and recently
challenged3 0 ), the illusory promise rule is animated by different con-
cerns from those requiring the mutuality of obligation doctrine that
recommends that both promises bind, as I explain in Parts II.C and
111.31 I therefore omit discussion of the illusory promise rule except
briefly in Part III's discussion of authorities which overrule or aban-
don mutuality of obligation.
This paper also does not discuss equity's mutuality of remedy doc-
trine. This doctrine is ably discussed in a number of sources. 3 2 In the
earliest reported equity cases, equity's mutuality of remedy looks a
great deal like the law's mutuality of obligation doctrine. Perhaps this
is because the common law reports of that period (before say, 1750) do
not discuss whether a promise is binding in the sense that it creates
an obligation. Instead, the discussion centers around whether a prom-
ise is actionable-whether the law gives a remedy for its breach.
Thus, at the earliest times both law and equity courts discussed
whether remedies were mutual.3 3 In early chancery reports, from
perhaps 1600 onward,3 4 the chancery occasionally declared that it
would follow the law generally with regard to which promises were
actionable. 3 5 Accordingly, in some early mutuality of remedy cases in
28. See UCC § 2-306(2) ("A lawful agreement by either the seller or the buyer for
exclusive dealing in the kind of goods concerned imposes unless otherwise agreed
an obligation by the seller to use best efforts to supply the goods and by the buyer
to use best efforts to promote their sale."); id. cmt. 5 ("An exclusive dealing agree-
ment brings into play all of the good faith aspects of the output and requirement
problems .... "); supra notes 26 & 27.
29. See Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126, 1130-31 (7th Cir.
1997); Schoeneck v. Chicago Natl League Ball Club, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 696, 702
(N.D. Ill. 1994); Economy Roofing & Insulating Co. v. Zumaris, 538 N.W.2d 641,
650 (Iowa 1995); United Serv's Auto Ass'n v. Schlang, 894 P.2d 967, 972 (Nev.
1995).
30. See Eisenberg, Probability & Chance, supra note 2, at 1012-18 (arguing that
courts should abandon the illusory promise doctrine).
31. See infra text accompanying notes 102-85 & 210-13 and especially notes 222-23.
32. See e.g., P.V. BAIMR & P. ST. J. LANGAN, SNEIL'S EQUITY 596 (1990); EDWARD
Yoiuo, CoNTRACT ENFORC M T: SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND INJUNCTIONS 127-
42 (1989).
33. As to the law decisions, see infra text accompanying notes 65-120. As to equity
decisions, see infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
34. Chancery reports extend back only to the mid-1500s, and between that date and
1660, reporting was incomplete and haphazard. See F.W. MATLAN, EQuIY: A
COUP SE OF LECTURES 9 (John Brunyate, ed., 2d ed. 1936). The YEARBooxs, re-
ports of law proceedings, in contrast, date back as far as the 13th century.
35. See Marquis of Normanby v. Duke of Devonshire, 2 Freeman 216, 216, 22 Eng.
Rep. 1169, 1169 (Ch. 1697) ("Where no action at law will lie to recover damages,
there this court will not execute the agreement in specie, for equity will never
make that a good agreement which is not good by law."); Anonymous, Cary 5, 5,
498 [Vol. 78:491
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equity, the court merely recites the mutuality of obligation doctrine
taken from the law courts.36 In other, later cases, a different doctrine
emerges: that a court of equity will not grant specific relief unless the
other party to the transaction was also entitled to specific relief or
some other equivalent equitable remedy.3 7 This conclusion is pre-
mised on the notion that remedies in equity and at law were unequal:
one party's remedy only at law did not cure this defect.38 This later
holding, which added a layer of doctrine and theory that the law's mu-
tuality doctrine did not include, became equity's mutuality of remedies
doctrine.39 While the equity doctrine was clearly related to law's mu-
tuality of obligation doctr ne,40 and further comparison would be in-
teresting, equity's mutual remedy doctrine deserves closer coverage
than a specific look at law's mutuality of obligation doctrine should
uncover. Further discussion is therefore omitted. A number of other
notions that lawyers occasionally and incorrectly call mutuality of ob-
ligation are mentioned in the margin.4 1
21 Eng. Rep. 3, 3 (Oh. c. 1570-1602) ("Upon nudum pactum there ought to be no
more help in Chancery than there is at the common law .... ").
36. See, e.g., Bromleyv. Fettiplace, 2 Freeman 245, 246, 22 Eng. Rep. 1187, 1187 (Ch.
1700) ("It was said, that generally this court will not execute an agreement in
specie, but when the agreement is such that an action at law will lie for damages
for the nonperformance of it"; but giving exceptions in equity to this rule and in
the end holding that the return promise was illusory because conditional on the
whim of the promisor); Bromley v. Jefferies, 2 Vern. Ch. Cases 415, 23 Eng. Rep.
867 (Ch. 1700) (same case as Bromley v. Fettiplace). In some early equity cases,
such as Armiger v. Clarke, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 19, 22 Eng. Rep. 16 (Ch.), Bunb. 111,
145 Eng. Rep. 614 (Ex. 1722), that the "remedy was not mutual" means that a
condition on one party's performance had failed. See also Lewis v. Lord Lech-
mere, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 20, 22 Eng. Rep. 17 (Case No. 17); 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 689, 22
Eng. Rep. 579 (Case No. 8) (Ch. 1722).
37. See Lewis v. Lord Lechmere, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 20, 22 Eng. Rep. 17 (Case No. 16); 2
Eq. Cas. Abr. 689, 22 Eng. Rep. 579 (Case No. 7) (Ch. 1722); Lewis v. Lord Lech-
mere, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 689, 22 Eng. Rep. 579 (Case No. 9) (Ch. 1722); Lewis v. Lord
Lechmere, 10 Mod. 503, 503, 88 Eng. Rep. 828, 828 (K.B. 1722) (stating in dicta;
proceeding to judgment based on failure of condition).
38. See Lewis v. Lord Lechmere, 10 Mod. 503, 88 Eng. Rep. 828, 829 (KB. 1722)
(stating in dicta: 'The Lord Chancellor was of opinion, that the remedy the ven-
dor had at law upon the articles was not adequate to that of a bill in equity for a
specific performance").
39. See Yomro, supra note 32, at 127-42 (attributing the entire doctrine as here stated
to Lord Fry's 1858 equity treatise, LoRD FRY, A TREATISE ON THE SPECIFIC PER-
FORNMANCE OF CoNTRAcTs (1858)).
40. Compare, e.g., Flight v. Bolland, 4 Russell 298, 38 Eng. Rep. 817 (Ch. 1828) (ad-
dressing whether an infant can sustain a suit for specific performance, and an-
swering no), with Forrester's Case, 1 Sid. 41, 82 Eng. Rep. 958 (K B. 1661)
(addressing whether an infant can sustain a suit in assumpsit for damages upon
a mutual promise, and answering yes), and Holt v. Ward Clarencieux, 2 Str. 937,
93 Eng. Rep. 954 (KB. 1732) (same holding as Forrester's Case, 82 Eng. Rep.
958).
41. A possible additional facet to the mutuality of obligation doctrine required that
each mutual promise become an actual, binding promise at the same time that
499
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Now on to the history of mutual promises and the mutuality of ob-
ligation doctrine.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MUTUAL PROMISE RULE
Exactly when the common lawyers first formulated the mutual
promise rule, that a mutual promise is consideration, is uncertain.
English pleadings show that various mutual promise cases were
brought in the form of action called "assumpsit 4 2 in the first half of
the other promise becomes an actual, binding promise; in other words, both must
become bound at the same time. See FARuswoRTH, supra note 18, § 3.2. This
aspect of mutuality of obligation is probably the least obvious. It is often as-
sumed to be within the general rules itself, because if the parties become bound
by mutual promises but not at the same time, then at some point one is bound but
the other is not, which would violate the general rule. This paper omits further
discussion of this aspect of mutuality of obligation because this aspect has been
subsumed wholly into the law of assent and is therefore no longer part of the
consideration-related doctrine primarily discussed in this paper. An outline of
how this change occurred is sketched in A.W.B. Simpson, Innovation in Nine-
teenth Century Contract Law, in LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL HISTORY 171, 185
(1987). Mutuality of obligation does not mean that the bargain must be equal.
See Kinley Corp. v. Ancira, 859 F. Supp. 652, 657-59 (W.D.N.Y. 1994); City of
Chicago Heights v. Crotty, 679 N.E.2d 412, 414 (Il. App. Ct. 1997). It also does
not mean that "every obligation or right is... met by an equivalent obligation or
right in the other party." City of Chicago Heights, 679 N.E.2d at 414; see Laclede
Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 522 F.2d 33, 36-37 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding irrelevant
that one party has a right to terminate though the other does not). This paper
does not discuss mutuality of assent, which means simply that both parties must
have assented, In re Broaddus Hosp. Ass'n, 159 B.R. 763, 765 (Bankr. N.D. W.
Va. 1993); Reed v. Citizens Ins. Co. of America, 499 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Mich. Ct. App.
1993); CoRBIN, supra note 2, § 152.
42. Common lawyers until the 1800s classified law within certain procedural forms
called "forms of action." (We 20th century lawyers classify laws more theoreti-
cally, by contract, property, tort, etc.) Lawyers still use the names of some of
these forms of action: trespass, debt, covenant, account, though their meanings
have changed. A lawyer placed his action within a form when pleading. Com-
plaining that the defendant owed a debt meant that laws for the form of action
debt applied to the suit. Complaining that the defendant had committed a tres-
pass meant that trespass laws applied. Assumpsit was a sub-set of trespass on the
case, which was itself a subset of trespass. Literally, assumpsit means undertak-
ing, or, in Latin, "he has undertaken." To undertake something by agreement or
promise and not to do it after having undertaken it came over a period of many
years (from perhaps 1400 to 1530 or so) to be thought of as a kind of trespass. Cf.
ROBERT C. PALMER, ENGLISH LAws IN THE AGE OF TH= BLACK DEATH 170-213
(1993) (describing numerous writs issued by Chancery between 1348 and the
1380s assuming that nonfeasance was actionable; noting that 15th century courts
recanted and refused to acknowledge that nonfeasance could be actionable in
trespass, only to change their minds again in the 16th century). As one might
suspect, the forms of action covenant and debt also remedied broken promises in
certain contexts. But assumpsit procedures included a jury trial and often made
available broader relief than debt and covenant procedures, so some plaintiffs
preferred assumpsit. From around the 1510s onward plaintiffs' lawyers sought to
expand the reach of the assumpsit form in the breach of promise area. The judges
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the sixteenth century, as early as 1518, but these pleadings do not
mention consideration.4 3 Lucy v. Walwyn, 44 (1561), is the first known,
reported assumpsit decision to discuss consideration by name, as a re-
quirement for recovery in assumpsit.4 5 And the Lucy facts show a
promise made reciprocally for another promise.46 But the report of
the case does not mention the mutual promise rule.4 7 At an Inner
Temple Moot in 1562, Thomas Gawdy (later a Justice on the Queen's
Bench)48 said that a promise to convey land given reciprocally for a
promise to pay for the land ought to be enforceable in an assumpsit
"even if no money was paid."49 KeilwayO disagreed, however, on the
grounds that no money was paid "in quid pro quo" for the promise.51
Anthony Gell, reporter of both Lucy and the moot, noted the similarity
of both.52 The mutual promise issue appears to have been in vogue
but unresolved at this early date.
in the royal courts fulfilled many plaintiffs' lawyers hopes, and within a century
assumpsit had come to cover even breaches also remedied in debt and covenant.
Assumpsit actions expanded so quickly into the business of compensating for bro-
ken promises that the courts felt a need to restrain the actions. The doctrine of
consideration filled this function. The common law courts declared that in as-
sumpsit only a promise made upon a sufficient consideration would be actionable.
The first case to require a valid consideration occurred in perhaps 1539, or
around that time. See David Ibbetson, Assumpsit and Debt in the Early Sixteenth
Century: The Origins of the Indebitatus Count, 41 CBAMBRDGE L.J. 142, 142
(1982). For the next 70 or 80 years, and most actively during the reigns of Eliza-
beth and James, the courts in case after case tried to sort out exactly when they
would allow recovery in assumpsit for breach of promise and when not. Consider-
ation, whatever it meant, was almost the only limitation the courts placed on
assumpsit actions for breach of promise.
43. See BAKER, LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 8, at 378-79 & n.42; SPELMAN'S RE-
PoRTs, supra note 8, at 268 (discussing Fyneux v. Clyfford (1518), 288 n.2, and
Shawe v. Duraunt (1529)).
44. See BARER & MILSOM, SOURCES, supra note 8, at 485.
45. See BAKER, LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 8, at 379.
46. See id. at 378-83.
47. See BAKER & MILsOM, SOURCES, supra note 8, at 485-87.
48. Thomas Gawdy (d. 1589) entered the Inner Temple in 1549. He was summoned
to take the degree of seijeant at law in 1558, but the writ abated by Queen Mary's
death. His appointment as seijeant then waited until 1567. Gawdy was ap-
pointed justice of the Queen's Bench in 1574 and knighted in 1578. He remained
on the bench until he died in 1589. Coke described him as "a most reverend judge
and sage of the law, of ready and profound judgment, and of venerable gravity,
prudence, and integrity." 4 Coke 54a, 76 Eng. Rep. 1007, 1012.
49. See BAKER & MIsoM, SOURCEs, supra note 8, at 487. Though the parties in Lucy
exchanged promises, Lucy's facts can be interpreted alternately as a promise
given in exchange for a future performance. See id. at 381.
50. Robert Keilway (1497-1581) was autumn reader at the Inner Temple in 1547,
seijeant-at-law as of 1552, and treasurer of the Inner Temple in 1557-58.
Keilway's name is known chiefly for law reports published under his name in
1602 and republished many times since.
51. See BAKER & MILSOM, SOURCES, supra note 8, at 487-88.
52. See id.
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Probably the first report of the mutual promise rule itself is West v.
Stowel153 (1577), which involved a wager. Stowell was engaged in an
archery match with Sir Charles Howard, Lord Effingham. 54 West, a
bystander, bet Stowell £10 that Effingham would beat Stowell in the
match. West and Stowell's bet, like most wagers, was a mutual prom-
ise, each promising to pay if he lost the bet. Effingham won the
match, but Stowell refused to pay West. West brought an action in
assumpsit. Justice Mounsen 55 said that West's "counter promise is a
reciprocal promise, and so a good consideration."5 6 But Justice
Manwood 5 7 disagreed, claiming that West, a mere bystander, did not
have enough invested in the match to enforce the bet.58 The report
does not say who won the lawsuit.5 9
53. 2 Leon 154, 74 Eng. Rep. 437 (C.P. 1577), reprinted in BAKER & MISOM,
SOURCES, supra note 8, at 494-495.
54. Charles Howard (1536-1624), Baron Howard of Effingham, Earl of Nottingham.
Charles Howard was Queen Elizabeth's first cousin once removed. Prior to 1577
he had served briefly as an ambassador to France (1559), a general of the horse in
suppression of a northern rebellion (1569), a member of parliament twice (1562 &
1572), and as commander of a squadron of ships (1570). He was knighted in
1574. He was appointed in 1585 lord admiral of England and in 1587 com-
mander-in-chief of the navy and army. Sir Francis Drake was his second in com-
mand in 1588 when the English defeated the Spanish Armada. He remained in
command of the navy until 1619.
55. Robert Mounsen (d. 1583) was called to the bar in 1550, was reader in 1565 and
1572, was made seijeant in 1574 and then later in the same year a judge of the
Common Pleas. He also served approximately ten years in parliament between
1553 and 1572. After the Queen disagreed with how he handled a case in 1579,
he resigned or was forced out of office.
56. West, 74 Eng. Rep. at 437, reprinted in BAKER & MILSOM, SOURCES, supra note 8,
at 495.
57. Roger Manwood (1525-92) was appointed judge of the Common Pleas in 1572. He
was knighted and appointed lord chief baron of the Exchequer in 1578. Manwood
was notorious for seeking to buy and sell government offices, including various
positions as judge. Just before Dyer, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, died in
1582, Dyer wrote to Queen Elizabeth that he wanted William Peryam to take his
place. Manwood is believed to have offered a great deal of money to have the
position. See 1 REPORTS FROM THE LOST NOTEOOKS OF SIR JAMES DYER xxxiii &
n.15 (109 Selden Society, J.H. Baker ed. 1994). The Queen gave it to Edmund
Anderson. See id. Manwood founded a grammar school in Kent, Sir Roger
Manwood's School, still in operation. The school's web page can be found at http:J
/www.rmplc.co.uk/eduweb/sites/srms/index.html. The link marked 'The School"
gives a brief history of the school and praises Manwood's foresight in planning for
the school's success. Thanks to Brian Simpson for information about the school.
58. Manwood argued that there was consideration between the participants in the
match, for they actually do something in relation to the promise: prepare equip-
ment, attend the match, labor in shooting, and travel "up and down between the
marks." West, 2 Leon. at 154, 74 Eng. Rep. at 437-38, reprinted in BAKER & Ala-
SOM, SOURCES, supra note 8, at 494-95. West as a spectator did none of these
things.
59. See West, 2 Leon. at 154, 74 Eng. Rep. at 437-38, reprinted in BAKER & MIIsOM,
SOURCES, supra note 8, at 494-95; see also BAKER, LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note
8, at 382 & n.45; SIMPSON, supra note 8, at 459-60.
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Various reports between 1578 and 1589 record the mutual promise
rule.60 Baker lists no fewer than eight reports of discussions during
this period.61 Fuller's Case62 refers to it. The rule seems to have been
settled by the end of the period, when a brief report of Strangeborough
v. Warner63 recorded tersely: "[A] promise against a promise will
maintain an action upon the case." The mutual promise rule is em-
ployed in much the same terms today; a "mutual promise" constitutes
consideration allowing recovery in contract.6 4 The mutuality of obli-
gation doctrine appears frequently in these early cases discussing the
mutual promise rule.
Ill. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MUTUALITY OF
OBLIGATION RULE
A. Genesis and Confusion
The early mutual promise cases show that the mutuality of obliga-
tion doctrine-that both mutual promises should bind their promis-
ors-was integral to the operation of the mutual promise rule. At this
early date, however, no lawyer talked of mutuality of "obligation."
The lawyers instead discussed only whether a promise was actionable.
(Indeed, whether a party exchanging promises could countermand its
promise before any performances occurred or suit was brought re-
mained the subject of judicial decision well into the seventeenth cen-
60. See BAKER, LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 8, at 382-83 & nn.45, 46, & 48.
61. See id.
62. Godbolt 94,78 Eng. Rep. 58, Goulds. 32,75 Eng. Rep. 975; SnIPsON, supra note 8,
at 637 (C.P. 1586).
63. 4 Leon. 3, 74 Eng. Rep. 686 (1589).
64. Compare Kirkby v. Coles, Cro. Eliz. 137, 78 Eng. Rep. 394 (KB. 1588) (Wray &
Clench, JJ.) (agreeing that this action properly "was grounded upon the promise"
given reciprocally), Gower v. Capper, Cro. Eliz. 543, 78 Eng. Rep. 790 (KB. 1596)
("[A] promise against a promise is a sufficient ground for an action."); Wichals v.
Johns, Cro. Eliz. 703, 78 Eng. Rep. 938 (K.B. 1599) (Popham & Clench, JJ.) (opin-
ing that an action was "well enough; for there is a mutual promise, the one to the
other"), Nicholas v. Raynbred, Jenk. 296, 145 Eng. Rep. 215, Hob. 88, 80 Eng.
Rep. 238 (1615) ("[Mlutual assumpsits ... make the consideration."), Ernely v.
Falkland, Hardres 104, 145 Eng. Rep. 403 (1655) ("[IThe consideration was ad-
mitted... to be good, being grounded upon.., a reciprocal promise."), and Peters
v. Opie, 1 Vent. 177, 86 Eng. Rep. 120 (1671) (Hale, J.) (opining that "the recipro-
cal promise [might be] the foundation of the consideration"), with Orange Im-
provements Partnership v. Cardo, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 85, 92 (D. Conn. 1997)
("[S]ufficient consideration... can take the form of mutual promises."), Odom
Antennas, Inc. v. Stevens, 966 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Ark. Ct. App. 1998) (affirming
that mutual promises were consideration for each other), Solimini v. Thomas, 688
N.E.2d 356, 361 (III. App. Ct. 1997) ("In addition, mutual.., promises provide
sufficient legal consideration to support each other."), and Allied Disposal, Inc. v.
Bob's Home Service, Inc., 595 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) ("Mutual
promises imposing some legal duty or liability on each promisor are sufficient
consideration to form a valid, enforceable contract.").
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tury.65 ) What is later called mutuality of obligation is in the early
period a reciprocity or mutuality of remedies.
This mutuality of remedies doctrine was litigated as early as 1578,
and probably earlier. An objection that no reciprocal remedy existed
prompted the discussion of the mutual promise rule in West v. Stowell,
implying that the doctrine had been discussed before, perhaps in an
earlier case. 66 The phrase "equall remedie" appears in a report at
least by 1579.67 Baker records that the doctrine appears continuously
throughout the period 1579 through 1587 in conjunction with the mu-
tual promise rule.68 The principle was the statement most commonly
appearing with the mutual promise rule in the last quarter of the six-
teenth century.
Wichals v. Johns69 illustrates how the mutuality of remedy rule
appears in early reports. Wichals promised to pay £120 on a debt that
Johns owed to Rogers, in consideration that Johns promise to pay
Wichals £120 on request. When Wichals sued Johns, Justices
Popham7O and Clench7l said:
65. See, e.g., Hurford v. Pile, Cro. Jac. 483, 79 Eng. Rep. 412 (1618); SMIMPSON, supra
note 8, at 466-70. But see, e.g., Ward v. Grimwise, Harv. MS 105b, f.23 (C.P.
1599) ("Acceptance of the undertaking implies a certain contract and assumpsit
on the part of the plaintiff.").
66. West v. Stowell, 2 Leon. 154, 74 Eng. Rep. 437 (C.P. 1577), reprinted in BAKER &
MILsoM, SOURCES, supra note 8, at 494, is discussed in detail supra at text accom-
panying notes 54-60 and again infra text accompanying notes 90-93, 146-47. The
first reported case to recite the mutual promise rule, West links the mutual prom-
ise rule to the notion of reciprocal remedies. Defense counsel objected to plain-
tiffs suit "that here is not any sufficient consideration; for the promise of the
plaintiff to the defendant, non parit actionem, for there is not any consideration
upon which it is conceived, but is onely, nudum pactum, upon which the defend-
ant could not have an action against the plaintiff." West, 2 Leon at 154, 74 Eng.
Rep. at 437 (emphasis added). In response, Mounsen, J., argues "that here the
consideration is sufficient, for here this counter promise is a reciprocal promise,
and so a good consideration." Id. He later states, "A cast at dice alters the prop-
erty, ifthe dice be not false; wherefore then is there not here a reciprocal action?"
Id., 2 Leon at 154, 74 Eng. Rep. at 438. The issue is not settled in the context of
this case, for Manwood, J., replies:
Such a reciprocal promise betwixt the parties themselves at the match is
sufficient; for there is consideration good enough to each, as the prepar-
ing of the bows and arrows, the riding or coming to the place appointed
to shoot, the labour in shooting, the travel in going up and down between
the marks: but for the bettors by, there is not any consideration.
Id., 2 Leon at 154, 74 Eng. Rep. at 437-38.
67. The phrase is from Anon. (KB. 1579), L.I. MS Misc. 488, p. 61, reported in BAKER,
LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 8, at 383 n.48.
68. See BAKER, LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 8, at 383 n.45, 46, & 48 (listing eight
discussions purportedly mentioning the doctrine); see also, e.g., Ibbetson, supra
note 8, at 86-87.
69. Cro. Eliz. 703, 78 Eng. Rep. 938 (KB. 1599).
70. John Popham (d. 1607) was the queen's attorney general for 11 years, from 1581-
92. Gossip during Popham's life held that he had been a highway robber before
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[Here] there is a mutual promise, the one to the other; so that if the plaintiff
doth not pay it to Rogers, the defendant may have his action against him: and
so also the defendant shall be charged as to him; and a promise against a
promise is a good consideration.
7 2
Fuller's Case7 3 also discusses the mutuality principle. In Fuller's
Case, the defendant stated to an elder son that, if the son "should be
willing to give his consent" that the son's father convey the father's
land to another, the defendant "would be willing" to give the son forty
shillings. The son later sued for the forty shillings. Lawyers involved
in the case seemed to agree that the defendant's statement amounted
to a promise but were uncertain whether the son was bound or not.
Justice Periam74 said that
in this case the son ought to promise to give his consent in consideration of the
other promise, or otherwise A [the defendant] has no remedy if the son is un-
willing to give his consent, and if it is thus the case that each one has a rem-
edy against the other it is a good assumption.7 5
Accordingly, Sergeant Fermor for the defendant objected that "the un-
dertaking was only on one side, and the other was free if he wished to
give his consent or not."76 Judgment in the end went to the son, prob-
ably because he had already performed by giving consent. This kind
of discussion remained a companion to the mutual promise rule from
Elizabethan times forward.77 Coke even mentions it in his commen-
tary on Littleton.78
his call to the bar. He succeeded Christopher Wray as Chief Justice of the King's
Bench in 1592. Popham presided over the King's Bench until Popham died in
1607.
71. John Clench (d. 1607) was appointed a baron of the exchequer in 1580 and in
1584 was transferred to the Queen's Bench.
72. Wichas, Cro. Eliz. at 703, 78 Eng. Rep. at 939.
73. Godbolt 94,78 Eng. Rep. 58, Goulds. 32,75 Eng. Rep. 975; SZIPSON, supra note 8,
at 637 (C.P. 1586).
74. William Periam or Peryam (1534-1604) was appointed judge of the Common
Pleas in 1581. He was promoted to Chief Baron of the Exchequer and was
knighted in 1593. He presided in the Exchequer until his death.
75. SninsoN, supra note 8, at 637.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Peters v. Opie, 1 Vent. 147, 177, 214, 86 Eng. Rep., 120, 144 (1671)
(Twisden, J.) ("[Aln action lies ... because of the mutual remedy."). Consider the
following from Blackstone:
If the husband be of years of discretion and the wife under 12, when she
comes to years of discretion, he may disagree as well as she may; for in
contracts the obligation must be mutual; both must be bound, or neither.
1 WmnI BLAcKsToNE, CommrNITms *436. Blackstone may have been quoting
Coke. See infra note 78.
78. Coke wrote:
If a man of the age of 14 marry a woman of the age of 10, at her age of 12,
he may as well disagree as she may, though he were of the age of con-
sent, because in contracts of matrimony either both must be bound, or
equal electing of disagreement given to both; and so e converso, if the
woman be of the age of consent and the man under.
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Though the early mutual promise cases show that judges thought
the mutuality of remedies doctrine necessary, these cases also show
that judges were confused about the rule's reach and purpose. For
instance, reports show that some judges held to a negative, strong
form of the mutuality of remedy doctrine-that lack of a reciprocal
remedy for the defendant meant that the plaintiffs promise could not
be consideration. But some judges held otherwise.
This uncertainty shows up especially in wager cases. For example,
in Butterye v. Goodman79 (1583), a suitor for the hand of a certain
woman made a deal with the woman's brother. The brother promised
that the woman was worth £1500 (in property). The consideration for
this promise was the suitor's counter-promise that, if the girl was
worth £1500, the suitor would pay the brother £200. The deal
amounted to a bet on the woman's monetary worth. The woman was
not worth £1500, and the suitor did not marry her. Instead, he sued
her brother for breach of promise. Notwithstanding the suitor's prom-
ise was mutual, two judges, WraySO and Ayloffe,81 thought it was not
consideration because the brother had no remedy on it for the £200.82
Indeed, only one party could have a remedy in such a wager-like
transaction, because only one of them could win the wager.8 3
Not all the judges agreed, however. One judge, Gawdy, J.,84
thought there was consideration in Butterye notwithstanding. The
mutual promises alone appear to have been enough for Gawdy-no
mutual remedy was necessary. Gawdy's view of wager cases won out
in the end. Courts decided conclusively at least by the mid-1600s that
EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF LAWS OF ENGLAND § 104 (1656).
79. See BAKER, LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 8, at 382-83 for a discussion of
Butterye.
80. Christopher Wray (1524-92) was admitted as a law student at Lincoln's Inn at
age 20 or 21. He was reader in autumn 1562, at about age 38, and again in 1567.
Wray also had a parliamentary career, from 1553-67, and again later in 1571,
when he was appointed speaker of the commons. Wray was appointed justice of
the Queen's Bench in 1572, at about age 48, and chiefjustice in 1574. He held the
chief justiceship for 172h years, until he died in 1592. Coke praised Wray's
"profound and judicial knowledge, accompanied with a ready and singular capac-
ity, grave and sensible elocution, and continual and admirable patience." 3 Coke
26a, 76 Eng. Rep. 684, 687.
81. William Ayloffe (d. 1585) was judge of the Queen's Bench by at least 1579.
82. See BAKER, LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 8, at 383.
83. A similar objection could be made to Justice Mounsen's statements in West v.
Stowell, 2 Leon. 154, 74 Eng. Rep. 437-38 (C.P. 1577), which involved a wager on
the outcome of an archery contest. Perhaps this factual twist in West prompted
the defense to object that no reciprocal remedy was available. See supra note 66
and infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
84. "M[The same Thomas Gawdy who had advocated the recognition of mutual
promises in 1562 .... " BAKER, LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 8, at 382.
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assumpsit based on mutual promises lay for wagers even though only
one party could win and no mutual remedy could exist.8 5
Twenty-five years after Butterye the entire court departed openly
from the negative, strong form of the mutuality of remedies doctrine
in Bettisworth v. Campion8 6 (1608). Here, the defendant promised to
pay for iron in exchange for the plaintiffs father's promise to deliver to
the defendant all the iron made in a certain furnace. The defendant
had not paid for all of the iron delivered. The plaintiffs father had
died, however, so the plaintiff sued defendant as executor. When the
plaintiff won a judgment, the defendant objected that the plaintiff had
failed to allege a complete performance of his father's promise. To this
the court answered that no allegation of performance was necessary
because "the consideration on each part was the mutual promise the
one to the other."8 7 In this case, however, no action could be had
against the plaintiffs testator father, the reciprocal promisor, because
he was dead, and the defendant could not sue the plaintiff for the tes-
tator's breach.8 8 No mutuality of remedy existed. The court overruled
85. Later wagering cases give a remedy in assumpsit as "grounded upon... a recip-
rocal promise." Ernely v. Lord Falkland, Hard. 103-04, 145 Eng. Rep. 403 (1655);
see Bulling v. Frost, 1 Esp. 235, 170 Eng. Rep. 341 (1794) (Kenyon, J.); Jackson v.
Colegrave, Carth. 338, 90 Eng. Rep. 797-98 (1695) ("[A] general assumpsit will
not lie for money won on a wager, or at play, but it must be laid by way of mutual
promises specially."); Bovey v. Castleman, 1 Ld. Raym. 69, 91 Eng. Rep. 942
(1695); Anon. v. Sterne, 2 Show. KB. 82, 89 Eng. Rep. 808 (1678) ("[Alt play there
are mutual assumpsits"); Walcot v. Tappin, 1 Keb. 56, 83 Eng. Rep. 808 (1662)
(enforcing a bet on whether Charles Stuart would be king of England within 12
months); Andrews v. Herne, 1 Lev. 33, 83 Eng. Rep. 283 (1662) (same as Walcot);
WiLAm SHEPPARD, AcTION ON THE CASE 178 (1663) ("There was a wager laid
between A and B concerning the quantity of yards of velvet in a cloak, and each of
them agreed that if there were ten yards of velvet in the cloak that then they
should be delivered to B, and if not to A. This is good and may be pursued accord-
ingly."); HowARD A. STREET, THE LAw OF GAmrNG 363-65 (1937); James B. Ames,
Two Theories of Consideration, 13 HARv. L. REv. 29, 34 (1899); Ibbetson, supra
note 8, at 86 n.108 (mentioning a wager case between participants in a contest,
Dassett's Case, founded on mutual assumpsits, which "caused no difficulty" in
1604); see also March v. Pigot, 5 Burr. 2802, 98 Eng. Rep. 471 (1771) (involving
two sons who bet against the longevity of their fathers, the winner being the son
with the father to die last; the jury enforced the bet, and the court refused to
grant a new trial). Compare Smith v. Aiery, 6 Mod. 128, 87 Eng. Rep. 885 (1705)
(holding indebitatus assumpsit does not lie for money won at play, and hinting
that recovery could be had on mutual promises), Walker v. Walker, 5 Mod. 13, 87
Eng. Rep. 490 (1694) (holding that indebitatus assumpsit does not lie for a wa-
ger), and Eggleton v. Lewin, 3 Lev. 118, 83 Eng. Rep. 607 (1683) (same), with
Anon. v. Sterne, 2 Show. KB. 82, 89 Eng. Rep. 808 (1678) ("debt lies at common
law for money got at play... ; indebitatus assumpsit lies for a wager").
86. Yelv. 133, 80 Eng. Rep. 90 (K.B. 1608). Bettisworth is discussed in detail in Ibbet-
son, supra note 8, at 87.
87. Bettisworth, Yelv. at 134, 80 Eng. Rep. at 90.
88. "M[The defendant cannot have an action against the plaintiff as executor on the
testator's breach...." Id., Yelv. at 134, 80 Eng. Rep. at 90. bbetson explains,
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this objection, however. Notwithstanding that the testator's promise
was unenforceable, the court explained, "yet the promise ex parte of
the defendant continues." Ibbetson notes from an unpublished manu-
script report of the case:
It was said that since at the time of the breach of the [testator] . . ., if there
had been any breach, [the defendant] was still alive, an action could have been
brought against [the testator], and it was the defendant who was at fault for
not having done so.89
Thus, by 1608 lack of a present mutual remedy did not mean abso-
lutely that the plaintiffs promise was not consideration for the
defendant's.
Bettisworth's position regarding mutual promises may be similar
to that taken by Justice Mounsen in West v. Stowell,90 in 1577. West
was a wager case (like Butterye): a bet on a shooting contest. Only one
party could win, but Justice Mounsen said there was sufficient consid-
eration for the loser's promise, "for here this counter promise is a re-
ciprocal promise, and so a good consideration."91 His comments make
clear he thought there was a sufficient reciprocal action. Perhaps he
reasoned that there was a reciprocal action before one shooter won the
match, and there would have been a reciprocal action had the other
party won, and if no action can be had now, it is only because the loser
bet poorly, a risk he clearly accepted when making the bet. Or per-
haps Mounsen adopted an affirmative view of the mutuality of obliga-
tion requirement, that the presence of a mutual promise indicates a
reciprocal action should exist; he asked, after all: "[WIherefore then is
there not here a reciprocal action?"9 2 But Manwood, J., thought no
reciprocal action existed, and the report does not settle the dispute.9 3
Even at that early date the judges did not know what to do with the
mutual remedies principle.
Since then, some common lawyers have continuously advocated
the consideration-destroying, strong form version of the mutual reme-
dies principle: that unenforceability of one promise means it can not
be consideration for another promise. Such a form appeared again in
cases in which one of two mutual promises was illegal. Oliver v. Oli-
"At this time the prevalent practice was to hold the executor liable (if at all) only
for the debts of his testator, not for unliquidated damages for breaches of con-
tract." Ibbetson, supra note 8, at 87 n.114.
89. Ibbetson, supra note 8, at 87. Ibbetson does not identify the source of this ration-
ale directly, but he gives as a source for Bettisworth only Yelv. 133 and L.I. MS
Hill 122 f.21. See id. at 87, 108. Yelverton does not report this reason.
90. 2 Leon. 154, 74 Eng. Rep. 437 (1578), discussed supra notes 53-59 and infra notes
146-47, and the accompanying text.
91. West, 2 Leon. at 154, 74 Eng. Rep. at 437.
92. Id., 2 Leon, at 154, 74 Eng. Rep. at 438.
93. "Such a reciprocal promise betwixt the parties themselves at the match [, the
shooters, would have been] sufficient." Id., 2 Leon. at 154, 74 Eng. Rep. at 437
(Manwood, J.).
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ver 9 4 (1624), for instance, involved a promise given in exchange for a
promise to pay interest. Justices Dodderidge and Whitlock agreed
that payment of interest, illegal as usury, would not be considera-
tion.95 Similar arguments from illegal consideration appear in other
cases around this time and earlier.9 6
But the application of a negative, strong form mutuality of obliga-
tion doctrine to promises to do illegal acts did not imply that the nega-
tive doctrine had been adopted in all contexts, as Blaxton v. Pye97
(1766), proves. In Blaxton, a wagering case like Butterye and West,
the judges held to the strong form version with respect to the illegal
promise but never mentioned it with respect to the wagering nature of
the transaction. Long after Butterye, Parliament declared some but
not all wagers illegal, based on the amount of the bet9S; by 1766 a
legal bet could be made against an illegal one. In Blaxton, Pye prom-
ised that, if a horse named Elephant won one of two races, Pye would
pay Blaxton eight guineas. Reciprocally, Blaxton promised to pay Pye
fourteen guineas if Elephant won no race. Elephant won one race, Pye
refused to pay, and Blaxton sued for the eight guineas. Plaintiff
Blaxton obtained a verdict, but Pye objected that Blaxton's promise to
94. 2 Rolle 469, 81 Eng. Rep. 922 (1624).
95. See id.
96. See also Sanderson v. Warner, Palmer 291, 81 Eng. Rep. 1087, 2 Rolle 239, 81
Eng. Rep. 772 (1622), in which a plaintiff sued on a promise to pay interest, given
in consideration for a promise to forbear from suit on a debt. Noy for the defense
suggested the promise to pay interest was illegal as usury and therefore invalid
as consideration. See id., Palmer at 291, 81 Eng. Rep. at 1088, 2 Rolle at 239-40,
81 Eng. Rep. at 773. The justices reached no conclusion on the legality of the
promise, and no further discussion occurred as to whether the promise to pay
interest could serve as consideration. See id. In a similar case in 1632, Harris v.
Richards, Cro. Car. 273, 79 Eng. Rep. 838 (1632), a promise to pay interest ap-
pears to have been held legal. See also SIPSON, supra note 8, at 510-18 (discuss-
ing generally the validity of contracts involving usury).
Dobbin's Case, Cro. Eliz. 151, 78 Eng. Rep. 408 (1587), also appears to involve
an illegal consideration. There the plaintiffundertook to assign his rights in cer-
tain land to the defendant, who promised to pay the plaintiff£40. After a verdict
for the plaintiff, the defendant moved in arrest of judgment that the plaintiffs
undertaking was "an unlawful consideration" because performance of it would
violate the statute, 32 Hen. 8, c.9. The court dismissed the objection in this case,
but the case shows counsel and judges were aware of such arguments and that
some thought the argument might win.
97. 2 Wils. KYB. 309, 95 Eng. Rep. 828 (1766).
98. One such early statute was An Act of Deceitful, Disorderly and Excessive Gam-
ing, 1664, 16 & 17 Car. 2, ch.7, § II, which provided:
[Iff any person... play at any of the said games [including cards, dice,
tables, tennis, bowls, skittles, shovelboard, cock-fights, horseraces, dog-
matches, and footraces], or any other pastimes ... (other than with and
for ready money) or shall bet on [other men's sides] and shall lose any
sum or sums of money, or other... things ... exceeding the sum of one
hundred pounds at any one time or meeting, [they] shall not in that case
be bound or compelled or compellable to pay or make good the same ....
509
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pay fourteen guineas was illegal under a statute outlawing any bet
above 10 guineas.99 Thus, Blaxton "could not possibly lose the four-
teen guineas, and therefore ought not to be allowed to win the eight
guineas" belonging to Pye.OO The entire court agreed.1o1 So the law
at the time of Blaxton was willing to enforce a wager in assumpsit on
the strength of the mutual promise rule even though only one party
could have an action against the other, as in Butterye, but not if one of
the promises was illegal-because then the agreement lacked mutual-
ity of obligation!
B. Later Development and Clarification: Rejection of
Negative Mutuality of Obligation
The apparent inconsistency in Blaxton with respect to the mutual
remedies rule-that it strips illegal promises of their consideration
function but does not so strip the promise made by the loser of a wa-
ger-probably never occurred to the court. I suggest it reveals under-
lying uncertainty about the mutuality of remedies or obligation
doctrine itself, even from the beginning. Neither judges nor lawyers
were sure what effect the doctrine should have, so lawyers continued
to raise it and judges responded as they thought appropriate given the
facts and their current understanding. Recall that in 1583 one judge,
Gawdy,' 0 2 thought there was consideration in Butterye, notwithstand-
ing that only one party could win the bet and sue the other. And the
court in Bettisworth and Justice Mounsen in West felt justified in de-
parting from the negative version of the rule.10 3 That lawyers and
judges have continued to wrestle with the effect of the rule for 400
years only amplifies the uncertainty as to what the rule was supposed
to mean.
99. The statute is the "Statute of Anne," An Act for the Better Preventing, Excesive,
and Deceitful Gaming, 1710, 9 Anne ch. 14, § H.
[Amny person ... who shall... by playing at cards, dice, tables, or other
game or games whatsoever, or by betting on the sides or hands of such as
do play any of the games aforesaid, lose to any... person.., so playing
or betting, in the whole, the sum or value often pounds, and shall pay or
deliver the same, or any part thereof, the person... losing, and paying
or delivering the same, shall be at liberty, within three months then
next, to sue for and recover the money or goods so lost, and paid or deliv-
ered, or any part thereof, from the respective winner ... thereof, with
costs of suit, by action of debt ....
The statute did not bar an action by a winner on such a bet, but the court in
Blaxton implied that result.
100. Blaxton, 2 Wils. K-B. at 309, 95 Eng. Rep. at 828.
101. See id.; see also Clayton v. Jennings, 2 Black. W. 706, 96 Eng. Rep. 416 (1770)
(same as Blaxton).
102. "[T]he same Thomas Gawdy who had advocated the recognition of mutual
promises in 1562 .... " BAxER, LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 8, at 382.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 86-93.
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The results in later decisions fall more in line with Bettisworth's,
Gawdy's, and Mounsen's view of the rule than with Wray and Ayloffe's
negative, strong-form version, however. Courts have generally held
throughout the last 400 years that, for purposes of the mutual promise
rule, even an unenforceable promise counts as consideration. In other
words, courts historically rejected the negative, strict version of the
mutuality of obligation doctrine in each case in which the reciprocal
counter-promise was declared for some reason unenforceable.1 0 4 This
104. Marriage cases in particular raised the issue in the common law courts, for inva-
riably one of two promises relating to marriage was alleged to be spiritual and
thus not within the jurisdiction of the common law courts. Some argued that
because the court would have no jurisdiction to enforce such a promise, no mutual
remedy existed on it, and neither promise was good. In these cases, the most
common resolution was that the court had jurisdiction. Baker v. Smith, Style
295, 82 Eng. Rep. 722, (1651), contains such an argument but no clear resolution
in published reports. In Baker, a man, Smith, and a woman, Baker, traded mu-
tual promises to marry, but then Smith changed his mind and promised Baker
10002 if she would discharge him of his promise. Smith never paid the money,
and Baker sued. Smith's counsel objected that "there is no temporal considera-
tion alleged, but only a promise to dissolve a contract of marriage, which is a
thing illegal, and so no consideration." Id., Style at 295, 82 Eng. Rep. at 723.
Chief Justice Rolle, in response, said that "engagement to marry is not meerly a
spiritual matter." Id. But the matter was held over till later in the term, and
neither the resolution of this issue nor of the case appears in Style. However,
Siderfin's Hebden v. Rutter, 1 Sid. 180, 82 Eng. Rep. 1043, 1 Lev. 147, 83 Eng.
Rep. 341 (1664), resolves the argument in favor of allowing both promises to
serve as consideration, on the authority of Baker v. Smith. 1 Sid. at 180, 82 Eng.
Rep. at 1044 ("Et sur cel declar' defendant demurr, et fuit dit que ceo ne fuit
ascun consideration, car marriage est un matter merement spiritual, et nul
ground pur assumpsit icy, mes per Curiam le declar' & consideration in ceo sont
bone, car marriage est un preferment, et le perd de ceo est un temporal perd, et
fuit adjudge bone consideration temps Roles Chiefe Justice in Baker & Smith's
case, Sti. 205. 304. Nota, que issue fuit apres joyne & trye in le principal case.").
Siderfi's report reveals that he did not think all the common law judges agreed,
however. 1 Sid. at 181, 82 Eng. Rep. at 1044 ("Nota, jeo fui un councel cest
mesme terme in autiel case sur breve de error hors de ceo Court in l'Exchequer-
Chamber, mes jeo ne osa insist sur cel pur doubt que le Court ne voil ceo oye
... "). Justice Windham mentions the issue in his discussion in Holcroft v. Dick-
enson, Carter 233, 234-45, 124 Eng. Rep. 933, 935, 1 Freeman 95, 89 Eng. Rep.
70, 3 Keble 148, 84 Eng. Rep. 645 (1673), noting prior resolutions of the issue in
favor of enforceability. When a similar argument about mutuality of obligation
was made finally in Holt's time, in Harrison v. Cage, 5 Mod. 411, 87 Eng. Rep.
736 (1698), Holt and his colleagues had merely to recite prior resolutions re-
jecting such objections. See Harrison, 5 Mod. at 411-12, 87 Eng. Rep. at 736-37.
Perhaps Holt's explanation is more explicit in Harrison because defense counsel
admitted that the man would be liable for breach of promise to marry. In Harri-
son, the plaintiff was a man. Holt reasoned from the mutuality of obligation doc-
trine that if a man would be liable, a woman would be, too, and on this ground
granted a remedy to the male plaintiff. See id., 5 Mod. at 412, 87 Eng. Rep. at
737. Holt's use of the mutuality of obligation rule is affirmative in the sense I
suggest the rule should be understood. See infra text accompanying notes 137-
38.
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rejection occurred in cases in which the counter-promise was void or
voidable for infancy, 0 5 insanity,' 0 6 fraud,107 duress, 0 8 or when the
promise was unenforceable under the statute of fraudslO9 (though
with some exception in this last caseLlO).
105. The promise of an infant was voidable at common law, meaning that an action
founded on it could be avoided by pleading the promisor's infancy. See, for exam-
ple, Coke's argument in Stone v. Withepoole, Owen, 94, 74 Eng. Rep. 924, 1 Leon.
114, 74 Eng. Rep. 106, Cro. Eliz. 126, 78 Eng. Rep. 383 (1588). In a mutual prom-
ise case in which the plaintiff was an infant, it would be natural to argue that the
infant's promise, being voidable, was not consideration. This happened in For-
rester's Case, 1 Sid. 41, 82 Eng. Rep. 958 (1661), where the argument was rejected
per curiam and the infant allowed to recover. Holt, J., reiterated this position in
Holt v. Ward Clarencieux, 2 Str. 937, 93 Eng. Rep. 954 (1732). See also
Monaghan v. Agricultural Fire Ins. Co., 18 N.W. 797, 805 (Mich. 1884). A similar
issue was addressed in Smith v. Bowen, 1 Vent. 51, 86 Eng. Rep. 36 (1669), in
which the defendant promised in consideration that the infant would permit the
defendant to enter the infant's close, cut the infant's grass, make it hay, and
carry it away, that the defendant would pay six pounds for the hay. The defend-
ant demurred to the declaration, "supposing it to be no consideration; for the in-
fant was not bound by his permission, but might sue him notwithstanding."
Smith v. Bowen, 1 Vent. at 51; 86 Eng. Rep. at 37. In this case as well the court
gave judgment to the infant plaintiff.
106. See Harmon v. Harmon, 51 F. 113 (C.C. N.D. IlM. 1892); San Francisco Credit
Clearing House v. MacDonald, 122 P. 964, 965 (Cal. Ct. App. 1912); Caldwell v.
Ruddy, 1 P. 339, 342 (Idaho 1881); Allen v. Berrybill, 27 Iowa 534, 1 Am. Rep. 309
(1869) ("[It is no defense to the sane party merely to show that the other party
was non compos mentis at the time the contract was made."); Atwell v. Jenkins,
40 N.E. 178, 179-80 (Mass. 1895); Hoadley v. Hoadley, 155 N.E. 728, 730 (N.Y.
1927).
107. In favor of this proposition, commentators have mostly cited cases involving re-
ciprocal marriage promises in which the man was already married. See, e.g., Kel-
ley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 8 Am. Rep. 336 (1871); Wild v. Harris, 7 C.B. 999, 137
Eng. Rep. 395 (1849); see also Plympton v. Dunn, 20 N.E. 180 (Mass. 1889) (mis-
representation). Various cases allow fraud victims to affirm a contract and sue
for its enforcement. See, e.g., National Bank of Decorah v. Robison, 203 N.W. 295
(Iowa 1925) (holding that a fraud victim may choose to stand on the contract and
sue for its breach); Wood v. Dudley, 176 N.Y.S. 494 (N.Y. App. Div. 1919) (same
as Robison); Larsen v. Chapin, 265 P. 441 (Or. 1928) (same as Robison).
108. See, e.g., Lewis v. Bannister, 82 Mass. 500 (1860).
109. See, e.g., Beckwith v. Clark, 188 F. 171, 175-76 (8th Cir. 1911); Cavanaugh v.
Casselman, 26 P. 515 (Cal. 1891); Hodges v. Kowing, 18 A. 979, 980 (Conn. 1889);
Burk v. Mead, 64 N.E. 880, 882 (Ind. 1902); Engler v. Garrett, 59 A. 648, 649-50
(Md. 1905).
110. See, e.g., Houser v. Hobart, 127 P. 997 (Idaho 1912); Willebrandt v. Sisters of
Mercy, 152 N.W. 85 (Mich. 1915); Wilkinson v. Heavenrich, 26 N.W. 139, 140
(Mich. 1886) ("It is a general principle in the law of contracts, but not without
exception, that an agreement entered into between parties competent to contract,
in order to be binding, must be mutual; and this is especially so when the consid-
eration consists of mutual promises. In such cases, if it appears that [because of
application of the statute of frauds] the one party never was bound on his part to
do the act which forms the consideration for the promise of the other, the agree-
ment is void for want of mutuality .... Such was the case here.")
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Calamari and Perillo suggest that mutuality of obligation doc-
trine-in a negative, strong form as they describe it-may yet apply in
mutual promise cases in which one promise is illegal.'-" The doctrine
appears occasionally in decisions stating that mutual promises are un-
enforceable when performance of one promise would constitute an ile-
gal act.112 And the doctrine's influence is still seen in the law's oft-
used label "illegal consideration," which is a ground for voiding a con-
tract or at least excising from it the illegal portions.113 Some consider-
ation-destroying application of the mutuality doctrine appears
theoretically possible here. But the overwhelming majority of cases
voiding a contract for illegality now rest on the policy that courts
should refrain from assisting in illegality or a violation of public pol-
icy. 114 Some seem also to say that the public policy or statute in-
111. CAAIAiam & PERmLO, supra note 9, at 227 & n.85, 889 & n.24. Calaiari & Pe-
rillo also suggest that a promise void for vagueness will also raise a mutuality of
obligation concern. They cite no case for this proposition, but Williston claimed it
in 1925. Williston pointed to citations in his treatise in support. See Samuel
Williston, The Effect of One Void Promise in a Bilateral Agreement, 25 COLUM. L.
REv. 857, 859 (1925). Professor Oliphant in response argued that Williston had
confusedly cited illusory promise cases in support of the mutual remedies rule.
See Oliphant, supra note 1, 28 COLUm. L. REv. at 998. I am persuaded by OHl-
phant's argument that a promise too vague to allow enforcement is not a promise,
and think that the correct rule to apply is the illusory promise rule rather than
the mutual remedies rule.
112. See, e.g., Dougherty, McKinnon & Luby, P.C. v. Greenwald, 484 S.E.2d 722, 723
(Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (reciting the rule but distinguishing it); National Consul-
tants, Inc. v. Burt, 366 S.E.2d 344, 351 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988); Shank v. Fidelity
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 21 N.W.2d 235, 239 (Minn. 1945); accord Quiring v. Quiring,
944 P.2d 695 (Idaho 1997) (refusing to enforce a contract promising to give a deed
because the return promise given in consideration was to do an illegal act, and
was therefore "illegal consideration"); Miesen v. Frank, 522 A.2d 85, 88 n.1 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1987) (refusing to enforce an obligation resting upon an illegal
consideration).
113. See, e.g., SEC v. Infinity Group Co., 993 F. Supp. 324,331 (E.D. Pa. 1998) ("Illegal
consideration is invalid consideration and thus cannot shield ill-gotten gains from
disgorgement."); Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior
Court, 949 P.2d 1, 12 (Cal. 1998) ("Illegal contracts, however, will be enforced
under certain circumstances, such as when only a part of the consideration given
for the contract involves illegality. In other words, notwithstanding an illegal
consideration, courts may sever the illegal portion of the contract from the rest of
the agreement."); Minor v. McDaniel, 435 S.E.2d 508, 510 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) ("If
the consideration is illegal in whole or in part, the whole promise fails." (citing
GA. CODE ANN. § 13-3-45)); Quiring v. Quiring, 944 P.2d 695, 701 (Idaho 1997)
("An illegal contract is one that rests on illegal consideration consisting of any act
or forbearance which is contrary to law or public policy.").
114. See, e.g., In re Sanborn, Inc., 181 B.R. 683, 691 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995) ("Massa-
chusetts courts will not aid in the enforcement of an illegal contract."); Johnson v.
Johnson, 237 Cal. Rptr. 644, 647 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) ('The rule that the courts
will not lend their aid to the enforcement of an illegal agreement or one against
public policy is fundamentally sound. The rule was conceived for the purposes of
protecting the public and the courts from imposition."); Minor v. McDaniel, 435
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fringed by the contract prohibits enforcement.'1 5 Moreover, courts
appear ready and willing to save all parts of an illegal contract that
can be severed.'1 6 The more cases one reads in this area, the more
readily one feels that courts truly have forgotten the application of the
mutuality of obligation doctrine to illegal contracts.
Hay v. Fortieri i 7 demonstrates a theoretical use for the negative,
strong form mutuality of obligation doctrine. Hay involved an agree-
ment between a surety and a creditor. When the principal debtor had
failed to pay, the surety sought an extension of time from the creditor.
In exchange for the creditor's promise to forbear suit, the surety prom-
ised to pay in installments the entire amount due. The court reasoned
in dicta that the creditor's promise to forbear was initially without
consideration, because the surety's promise was only to perform a
prior duty. The creditor's promise was thus unenforceable. That
meant that the surety's promise to pay in installments was also with-
out consideration, under the negative, strong form of the mutuality of
obligation doctrine. In the end, however, the court found the mutual-
ity of obligation doctrine irrelevant because the creditor had per-
S.E.2d 508, 510 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) ("A court ofjustice will not lend its aid to the
enforcement of any contract the making of which is prohibited, nor to the enforce-
ment of anything necessary to complete the accomplishment of an unlawful pur-
pose. If the contract is executed it will be left to stand; if it be executory neither
party can enforce it." (internal quotations omitted)); American Home Assurance
Co. v. Golomb, 606 N.E.2d 793, 796 (M1. App. Ct. 1993) ("Where enforcement of an
illegal contract is sought, the courts will aid neither party but will leave them
where they have placed themselves since the parties are par! delicto and can re-
cover nothing under the contract." (internal citations omitted)); An-Cor, Inc. v.
Reherman, 835 P.2d 93, 96 (Okla. 1992) ("Courts will not enforce or aid in en-
forcement of a contract made in violation of law, nor grant relief at the instance of
a plaintiff who, in order to prevail, is compelled to rely on an illegal contract.").
115. See, e.g., Wilson v. Steele, 259 Cal. Rptr. 851, 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) ("The se-
vere sanction of the [licensing] statute prevents enforcement of an illegal contract
and protects the public from the perils incident to contracting with incompetent
or untrustworthy contractors."); T.E.C. & Assocs. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 476
N.E.2d 1212, 1220 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) ("In Illinois, generally, a statute which
declares an act illegal and which imposes a penalty for its violation renders a
contract for the performance of such an act void and unenforceable.").
116. See, e.g., Lulirama Ltd., Inc. v. Axcess Broad. Servs., Inc., 128 F.3d 872, 880 (5th
Cir. 1997) ("Under Texas contract law, illegal contracts are generally unenforce-
able. However, a court will sever the illegal portion of the agreement and enforce
the remainder if the parties would have entered the agreement absent the illegal
portion of the original bargain." (internal citations and quotations omitted)); Bir-
brower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d
304, 315 (Cal. 1998) ("[Nlotwithstanding an illegal consideration, courts may
sever the illegal portion of the contract from the rest of the agreement."); Bryant
v. City of Atlantic City, 707 A.2d 1072, 1090 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) ("It
is well established that a court can sever an illegal portion of a contract that does
not defeat the agreement's central purpose.").
117. 102 A. 294 (Me. 1917).
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formed its promise, and the creditor's performance counted as
consideration even though the creditor's promise would not.118
Though a consideration-destroying function remains theoretically
possible in a case like Hay in which no performance has occurred, I
would recommend against such an application of the mutuality of obli-
gation doctrine. The rule rendering invalid as consideration a promise
to perform a prior legal duty is generally understood to be a safeguard
against breach of public policy, extortion, economic duress, lack of
good faith, or other fairness concerns. 1 19 The law holds that even a
reciprocal promise voidable for these reasons is consideration, how-
ever. For purposes of the mutuality of obligation doctrine, if merely
these concerns are at issue the law may as well hold also to be consid-
eration the promise to perform a prior duty.120
The negative, strong form of the mutuality of obligation doctrine
thus appears to be dead.121 The Restatement (Second) in general con-
curs. "The fact that a rule of law renders a promise voidable or unen-
forceable does not prevent it from being consideration."122 Courts and
118. See id. at 295.
119. See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 2, at 936-38 (listing duress, coercion, deception, or
lack of good faith, breach of public policy); Wessman, Consideration II, supra note
2, at 748 (listing duress and other overlapping doctrines).
120. Ward v. Goodrich, 82 P. 701 (Colo. 1905), appears to hold as much but gives no
explanation that this is what it is doing. In Ward, the husband, Ward, was bound
by court order to pay to wife, Goodrich, $8 per week in child and spousal support.
By agreement, Ward promised to pay Goodrich $200 in cash immediately and
$2.50 per week thereafter until the child reached age 15. In return, Goodrich
promised to drop her action for support and maintenance. After the agreement
was signed, Goodrich did drop her support suit, and Ward paid $200 in cash and
began to pay the $2.50 per week, which he continued to pay for more than two
years before defaulting. Goodrich sued Ward for breach, and Ward's counsel ar-
gued the same argument raised in Hay: that 1) Ward's promise was not consider-
ation for Goodrich's promise, 2) Goodrich's promise was therefore not enforceable,
and 3) Ward's promise was therefore not enforceable either. The court said:
While it is settled that the promising to do, or the doing of, that which
the promisor is already legally bound to do, does not, as a rule, constitute
consideration for a reciprocal promise, or support a reciprocal undertak-
ing given by the promisee, it by no means follows that such promise may
not be enforced against such promisor by the promisee, although its en-
forcement compels the performance of that which was already a legal
obligation.
Id. at 702. The court agreed with the rule stated in the Hay dicta "as a rule" but
enforced the promise anyway, without explaining why. The purpose of the rule
that a prior legal obligation is not consideration is commonly said to be preven-
tion of duress. Perhaps the Ward court analogized this case to a case of duress, in
which the voidability of the promise provides good reason for enforcing only one
of two mutual promises.
121. But see ISS Int'l Serv. Sys., Inc. v. Alabama Motor Express, Inc., 686 So. 2d 1184,
1189 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (holding in the alternative a contract void for want of
mutuality because one party's promise not to compete was unenforceable by
statute).
122. RESTATEiENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 78 (1981).
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commentators, reading the doctrine only in its negative, strong form
as did Wray and Ayloffe in Butterye, have said that, as a result, the
mutuality of obligation doctrine itself has not fared well. "Exceptions"
to the rule have swallowed it up, they say. 123 The Restatement (Sec-
ond) agrees in this assessment. It states that "mutuality of obliga-
tion" means at most only the illusory promise rule.' 2 4 Perhaps these
comments have prompted some courts to say that the Restatement
(Second) has rejected the mutuality of obligation doctrine.12 5 I sug-
gest that the mutuality of obligation doctrine is alive and well, how-
ever. Moreover, I suggest that the doctrine not be rejected or
overruled, because the doctrine still serves a vital function and be-
cause, if it is properly understood, no good reason exists to overrule it.
C. Why the Mutuality of Obligation Doctrine Remains Vital:
Affirmative Mutuality of Obligation
That the negative, strong form version of the mutuality of obliga-
tion doctrine has been rejected does not mean that the doctrine itself
should be abandoned. An affirmative, weak form of the doctrine sur-
vives. In fact, lawyers are so accustomed to its role that they routinely
assume its function. Perhaps no commentator has discussed this ver-
sion of mutuality of obligation before because they assumed that the
mutuality of obligation or remedies doctrine was a justification for the
mutual promise rule. They have argued that a promise's binding na-
ture is what gave it value and justified its status as consideration.' 26
Please set that idea aside as you read the following. Instead, assume
that even non-binding promises are consideration. That is what the
judges did in enforcing wagers as mutual promises in assumpsit.12 7
Enforcing wagers as mutual promises in assumpsit requires logically
that one accept promises themselves-not their binding nature or
their later performance-as consideration, because in the end only one
person will pay. Once we assume the mutual promise rule works
123. See Oliphant, supra note 1, 28 COLUM. L. REV. at 1012-13; see also GROVER C.
GRISMORE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw OF CoNTRAcTs § 68 (1947); Eisenberg,
Probability & Chance, supra note 2, at 1013 ("[Ihe doctrine is, for practical pur-
poses, largely a nor de plume for the illusory promise rule.") (implying that if the
mutuality of obligation doctrine has no consideration-destroying function, it has
no function at all).
124. RE STATEmENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 & cmt. f (1981).
125. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Bickel, 66 F.3d 438, 451 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating
that "mutuality of obligation" has been largely rejected as a general principle in
contract law, and citing the RESTATEmENT (SEcOND)); Design Benefit Plans, Inc.
v. Enright, 940 F. Supp. 200, 205 (N.D. IlM. 1996) ("[The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts ... rejects ... the doctrine of mutuality of obligation ...
126. See, e.g., Oliphant, supra note 1, 25 COLUM. L. REV. at 720.
127. See supra note 85.
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whether or not the reciprocal promise is binding, the necessity for the
affirmative mutuality of obligation doctrine becomes apparent.
For example, suppose A and B exchange promises (mutually as-
senting in the process). Now suppose the law enforces A's promise on
the ground that it was given in exchange for B's promise. Once the
law has done so, the policy that the law must treat parties equally,
absent good reason to do otherwise, requires the mutuality of obliga-
tion-or remedies-doctrine. Does the law have any reason not to en-
force B's promise also, which was given in exchange for A's? No reason
exists a priori for not enforcing both. On each side of the transaction,
the facts, or at least the categories into which facts are grouped by the
law, are the same. The result is that the law must presumptively en-
force both promises if it decides to enforce one of them. To treat the
parties equally, the law must offer the same remedies to both parties
initially. This is the meaning of "both must be bound or neither
should be." Fairness and equality under the law demand that this
proverb be a corollary-in this affirmative, remedy-implying form-to
the mutual promise rule. Later, or more particular, facts might show
that some remedies or even enforcement itself of one promise is inap-
propriate, but absent such facts the law to be fair must presume
"equal remedies" on both sides. In the twentieth century, perhaps this
may seem too obvious to state.
But what seems obvious now was not so in the late sixteenth cen-
tury. A review of sixteenth century assumpsit procedure illustrates
particularly why this rule of abstract justice may have been stated so
often. Procedures in mutual promise cases were much simpler then
than now. The plaintiff would plead before the King's Bench or Com-
mon Pleas, generally. Only three elements were necessary: a promise,
consideration, and breach.128 In the sixteenth century no require-
ment of assent existed. 12 9 No reified "contract" was pleaded or shown
to exist. Only one party's promise, the defendant's, was at issue in the
case. The defendant would plead in response.so If factual issues re-
mained, the lawyers would take the case to a jury. If the plaintiff won
the trial, then the defense might come back to the King's Bench or
Common Pleas to complain of legal errors.13 1 Lack of sufficient con-
sideration was a common objection after trial.
128. "In every action upon the case upon a promise, there are three things considera-
ble, consideration, promise and breach of promise ..... Golding's Case, 2 Leon.
72, 74 Eng. Rep. 367, 367 (1586) (Egerton for the defendant); see SmpsoN, supra
note 8, at 574-75, 580-82.
129. See, e.g., SIMpSON, supra note 8, at 407.
130. The defendant might deny any particular fact, or all of the plaintiffs case, or
raise a legal issue, or admit facts and assert others. See generally BAKER, ENG-
LISH LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 8, at 90-107; SnpSON, supra note 8, at 578-79.
131. This might be done most commonly by a motion in arrest of judgment, or in lim-
ited instances by a motion for a new trial. See BAKER, ENGLISH LEGAL HMSTORY,
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Now say you are sitting on the King's Bench reviewing one of these
objections. The defendant's promise has been tried, not the plaintiffs.
When the defendant objects that there is no consideration alleged on
which his promise was made, what is a judge to do? The courts held
that the plaintiffs promise was consideration for the defendant's.
Having decided that, the courts must have seen immediately that the
defendant's promise had simultaneously become consideration for the
plaintiffs promise.132 That meant that the defendant in a suit against
the plaintiff could satisfy two elements: promise and consideration,
and this was necessarily so, because the plaintiff could not obtain a
verdict against the defendant if it were otherwise. The law must, in
order to treat the parties equally, have admitted that the defendant
would likewise have a remedy, or at least an equal chance at one,
against the plaintiff.
At this stage of litigation between the parties, whether the defend-
ant actually had a remedy against the plaintiff was almost always ab-
stract, and necessarily so. Except in the rare case in which the
plaintiff appeared to have a clear legal defense, such as the non-occur-
rence of a condition as in Butterye or perhaps the plaintiffs infancy as
in Forrester's Case,1 33 no way existed to say whether the defendant
could actually enforce the plaintiffs promise. No way existed to tell
whether the defendant had actually sued (or could actually sue) the
plaintiff in a countersuit. Finally, the plaintiff in a mutual promise
case did not even have to allege or show whether she had or had not
performed her promise.' 34 Thus, it is possible in some cases that the
mutuality of remedies doctrine was recited even though the plaintiff
had already performed. (In such cases the rule's application must
have seemed odd to defendants who had already recovered or to plain-
tiffs when the court hinted that they might be sued on a promise al-
ready fulfilled.) If the plaintiff had not yet performed, the rule would
supra note 8, at 98. Arrest of judgment was the method employed in Fuller's
Case, for example. See supra text accompanying notes 73-77.
132. In fact, the royal courts required that the promises be given simultaneously. See
Nichols v. Raynbred, Hob. 88, 80 Eng. Rep. 238 (1615) ("Note here the promises
must be at one instant, for else they will be both nuda pacta."); Jenk. 296, 145
Eng. Rep. 215, 216 (1615) ("[Sluch mutual assumpsits ought to be made at the
same time; for they make the consideration, and the consideration and the prom-
ise always ought to be together: otherwise it is nudum pactum.").
133. 1 Sid. 41, 82 Eng. Rep. 958 (1661); see supra note 105 for a discussion of For-
rester's Case.
134. See Gower v. Capper, Cro. Eliz. 543, 78 Eng. Rep. 790 (KB. 1596) ("[The alledg-
ing that he had delivered the bill was but surplusage; for the consideration was
the promise to deliver it; and therefore he needed not have alledged that he deliv-
ered it. But a promise against a promise is a sufficient ground for an action."); see
also Bennett v. Astell, 1 Lev. 20, 83 Eng. Rep. 276 (1660); Hurleton v. Webb,
Benloe 150, 73 Eng. Rep. 1003 (1626); Lampleigh v. Brathwait, Hobart 105, 80
Eng. Rep. 255 (1616); Ibbetson, supra note 8, at 85 n.100.
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have given defendants cold comfort at best, because to win on such a
suit the defendant may have had to subject himself to a jury trial and
collection procedures.13 5 In this procedural posture, the mutuality of
remedies doctrine amounts to little more than a recognition that the
elements for a suit against the plaintiff appear in the abstract to exist
and a recommendation that both sides of a business transaction
should be enforceable equally, rather than only one-that both should
be enforced, or neither. The judges appear to have been saying, "well,
if we are going to give a recovery to the plaintiff, then we had better
tell the defendant he has the same chance." The mutuality of reme-
dies or obligation doctrine thus did not require that the counter-prom-
ise actually be enforceable but only that the law make available to the
defendant the same chance at recovery that the plaintiff had against
the defendant. The rule would have nearly always been affirmative in
meaning as used in this procedural context.
In fact, the most famous mutuality of obligation case, the one Wil-
liston pegged as the mutuality doctrine's creator,' 3 6 Harrison v.
Cage,13 7 used the mutuality of obligation doctrine only affirmatively!
Harrison, a man, promised to marry Cage. Cage, in return, promised
to marry Harrison. But Cage married another instead, so Harrison
sued Cage for breach of promise. Before the King's Bench, Cage's
counsel made a fateful error. He argued that a woman is not liable for
breach of promise to marry but admitted that a man may be. Holt,
C.J.,13s lit on this admission to explain why Harrison could recover.
The action of a woman against a man for breach of promise to marry
was and is based on the mutual promise rule, Holt explained.' 3 9 Be-
cause the woman stands in no different position than does the man,
the mutuality of obligation doctrine must also apply: "Either all is a
nudum pactum, or else the one promise is as good as the other."'140
Therefore, Holt held Harrison the man had as good a remedy as did
135. For an argument assuming some hardship on defendant's part on being "driven
to his cross action" on mutual promises, see Peters v. Opie, I Vent. 177, 214, 86
Eng. Rep. 120, 144, 2 Keble 837, 84 Eng. Rep. 529, 3 Keble 45, 84 Eng. Rep. 586
(1672) ("Hale Chief Justice said he never allowed a reciprocal promise, where the
intent appears the work should be done before the mony paid, else a man might
be forced to pay and sue a beggar.").
136. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
137. 5 Mod. 411, 87 Eng. Rep. 736 (1698).
138. John Holt (1642-1710) was the son of a barrister and sergeant-at-law. Holt was
admitted to Gray's Inn at age 9. He entered Oxford at 15 but never earned his
degree. He was instead called to the bar at 21. Holt was elected an "ancient" of
Gray's Inn at 32. He once resigned from a semi-judicial office upon refusing to
pass a sentence of death on a deserter from the army. After taking part in a
number of prominent trials, Holt was appointed Chief Justice of the King's Bench
in 1689, at age 46, and served for 20 years. A number of Holt's decisions remain
influential in contract, bailment, and commercial law.
139. See Harrison, 5 Mod. at 412, 87 Eng. Rep. at 737.
140. Id.
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Cage the woman.1 41 The mutuality of obligation doctrine did not ne-
gate a promise as consideration but required a mutual remedy!
This affirmative mutuality of obligation doctrine was not inevita-
ble. (Edwin Patterson rightly concluded that mutuality of obligation
"is not strictly part of the bargain concept."14 2) The common law was
long concerned with the notion that a business transaction should be
actionable by both parties, but it never held such equality of remedies
to be a foregone conclusion. The question did not arise often, because
most transactions reached the courts only after they were half-exe-
cuted. In a half-executed transaction, the question is moot: If a benefit
is already conferred on the defendant or a detriment suffered by the
plaintiff, the defendant has performance itself and does not need an
equal remedy against the plaintiff. In such cases equality demands
only that the plaintiff alone be given a chance at her part of the
bargain.
But when the common law enforced one of two mutual and execu-
tory promises, the judges appeared to feel a necessity to declare that
the other promise was at least potentially enforceable. Long before
working out liability for breach of promise in assumpsit in the mid to
late sixteenth century, judges discussing wholly executory sales agree-
ments often felt the need to clarify that both sides were enforceable by
some writ or another.143 The judges often buttressed this result by
141. You agree a woman shall have an action; now what is the consideration
of a man's promise? Why, it is the woman's. Then why should not his
promise be a good consideration for her promise, as well as her promise
is a good consideration for his? There is the same parity of reason in the
one case as there is in the other, and the consideration is mutual.
Id.
142. Patterson, supra note 2, at 939.
143. See, e.g., Anon., 1 Dyer 29b, 30a, 73 Eng. Rep. 65, 66 (1537):
And this diversity was taken, when the day of payment is limited, and
when not: in the first case, the contract is good immediately, and an ac-
tion lies upon it without payment; but in the other not so: as ifa man buy
of a draper twenty yards of cloth, the bargain is void, if he do not pay the
money at the price agreed upon immediately; but if the day of payment
be appointed by agreement of the parties, in that case, one shall have his
action of debt, the other an action of detinue.
See also Orwell v. Mortoft (1505), reprinted in BAKER & MILSOM, SOURCES, supra
note 8, at 406, 409 (Kingsmill, J.) ("Every bargain shall be interpreted equally as
between the parties, and not more in favour of one than the other."); Anon.,
C.H.S. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAws 252 (1949) (1478)
(Catesby arguing for the defendant: "[In every such bargain the law assumes
that, as the one puts his trust in the other to have the thing for which they have
bargained, so ought the other e contra."); Anon., BAKER & MnSOM, SoURcEs,
supra note 8, at 236, 236 (1458) (Prysot, J.) (listing some exceptions to a mutual-
ity of remedies policy: "For instance, if a man buys a cow or a horse from me for
20s., I shall have a good action of debt against him by reason of the sale; and yet
it is possible that the buyer had no quid pro quo, for it may be that I have no
horse .... If, however, I do have a horse, he may take it out of my possession by
virtue of the sale."); Doige's Case (1442), reprinted in BAKER & MRISOM, SoURcEs,
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claiming that property (or property rights) passed at the time of the
bargain and sale, even though neither party had yet performed.144
Each promisee gained a property right in the thing the other party
had promised to exchange. If the property of each promisor passed at
the time of the sale, then before either had performed each promisee
had an action against the other to obtain its property. Each promisee
had a property-based and therefore an "equal" remedy against the
other, equal at least in an abstract sense. 145
West v. Stowel1146 (1577), the first reported case to recite the mu-
tual promise rule, ties the mutual promise rule both to the mutuality
of remedies doctrine and this property passing rationale. Mounson, J.,
in response to an objection that no reciprocal remedy exists, argues by
analogy from a gambling case: "A cast at dice alters the property, if
the dice be not false; wherefore then is there not here a reciprocal ac-
tion?"147 In other words, Mounson might say, mutual promises give
supra note 8, at 390, 394, quoted infra in judges' discussion notes 150-51 and
accompanying text; ANTHONY FizHERBERT, THE NEW NATuRA BRiEvm 286 (1652
English ed., original published in 1534 in Law French) (discussing debt for both
sides of a sales contract at once, in the debet and detinet for money and in the
detinet only for "20 quarters of wheat, or a horse").
144. The view that bargains or sales of goods are actionable on each side before money
or goods change hands is consistent with the notion that property passes at the
time of the sale. See, e.g., Tailboys v. Sherman (1443), reprinted in BAKER & MIL-
soM, SOURCES, supra note 8, at 395, 396 ("As soon as the bargain was made, the
property was in the plaintiff... ."); David bbetson, From Property to Contract:
The Transformation of Sale in the Middle Ages, 13 J. LEGAL HIsT. 1 (1992) [here-
inafter Ibbetson, Transformation]; David Ibbetson, Sale of Goods in the Four-
teenth Century, 107 L.Q.R. 480, 490-99 (1991) [hereinafter Ibbetson, Fourteenth];
S.F.C. Milsom, Sale of Goods in the Fifteenth Century, 77 L.Q.R. 257,271-72,274-
76, 282-84 (1961) [hereinafter Milsom, Sale of Goods].
145. Milsom speculates that the property rationale may have come about "precisely
because a difficulty was suddenly felt about executory contracts" or because of
difficulties perceived in the action of detinue. Milsom, Sale of Goods, supra note
144, at 273-75, 283. Ibbetson agrees that the property doctrine fits well with the
notion that both sides of an entirely executory bargain were actionable, and ex-
plains these ideas in much greater detail. See Ibbetson, Transformation, supra
note 144, at 12-13 (noting that in England, where the property theory was re-
tained, practices did not differ much from elsewhere in Europe where the prop-
erty theory was laid aside); Ibbetson, Fourteenth, supra note 144, at 490-99.
146. 2 Leon. 154, 74 Eng. Rep. 437, 438 (C.P. 1577), reprinted in BAKER & MluSOM,
SOURCES, supra note 8, at 494.
147. Id., 2 Leon at 154, 74 Eng. Rep. at 438, reprinted in BAKER & MILSOM, SOURCES,
supra note 8, at 495. Mounson's entire position in the case responds to defense
counsel's primary objection: "[Tihat here is not any sufficient consideration; for
the promise of the plaintiff to the defendant, non parit actionem, for there is not
any consideration upon which it is conceived, but is onely, nudum pactum, upon
which the defendant could not have an action against the plaintiff." Id., 2 Leon at
154, 74 Eng. Rep. at 437, reprinted in BAKER & MILSOM, SOURCES, supra note 8,
at 495 (emphasis added). Manwood's response also discussed property-based rea-
soning "At dice the parties set down their monies, and speak words which do
amount to a conditional gift; (scil.) if that the other party cast such a cast he shall
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each promisee a property right in the reciprocal promisor's wagered
item, so that each promisee has a remedy against the other. In citing
the property rule, Mounsen implies that the problem in the mutual
promise case was similar to that in the executory bargain and sale
cases, or at least to a property-based law of gaming.
Occasionally common lawyers enforced one side of a business
transaction but not the other. These instances are scattered through-
out history and the yearbooks, but were known and adhered to by
later generations. Consider Prysot's dicta in Anon.:
But in some cases I have a good action of debt against a man because of a sale,
and I shall have the thing sold, and yet he shall not take it by reason of the
sale. For instance, ifI sell a man the manor of Dale (whereof I am seised) for
£100, I shall have a good action of debt against him on the contract; and yet
the property of the manor is not in the purchaser by this contract, and he may
not enter into the manor by virtue of this sale without livery and seisin. More-
over, I shall have a good action of debt even if I have no manor, but that is
because of the contract.
1 4 8
Thus, sometimes remedies were not reciprocal and equal; in such
cases no affirmative presumption of mutual remedies operated, be-
cause the facts necessary for enforcement, or at least the legal catego-
ries into which facts were placed, were not the same on both sides.149
In Prysot's dicta, the seller's remedy at the time was an action on a
contract but the buyer's remedy was an action for the land. If the
seller had no land, the buyer could never obtain the land, on the con-
tract or otherwise. The law simply gave the buyer no remedy.
But judges avoided this result if they could. Though the purchaser
of land might have no mutual remedy in 1458 if the seller had no land,
if the seller initially had land but after entering into the contract con-
veyed to someone other than the purchaser, the purchaser might sue
in assumpsit for deceit. A primary argument for this rule, laid down
in Doige's Case'50 (1442), was that otherwise the remedies would not
be equal. In now rather well-known language, Justice Newton ar-
gued, "It would be amazing law, then, if there should be a perfect bar-
gain under which one party [the buyer] would be bound by an action of
debt but would be without remedy against the other."151
have the money." Id. at 154, 74 Eng. Rep. at 438, reprinted in BAKER & MILSOM,
SOURCES, supra note 8, at 495.
148. Anon., reprinted in BAKER & MILSOM, SOURCES, supra note 8, at 236 (C.P. 1458).
149. See also, e.g., Ibbetson, Fourteenth, supra note 144, at 493, 499.
150. Shepton (or Shipton) v. Dogge (Doige's Case) (1442), reprinted in BAKER & MIL-
SOM, SOURCES, supra note 8, at 390.
151. Id. at 393 (1442). In Doige's Case the seller of land had promised informally to
convey but then conveyed to another. Conversation continues in response to
Newton's comment:
FoRTEscuE : If the case put by Newton be law, then there is no question
concerning the law in our case: for if each party to a bargain should be
bound by an action, it must follow that this action of deceit is
maintainable.
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Common lawyers of the late sixteenth century also recognized the
need for equal remedies in business dealings. Consider, for instance,
Ward v. Grimwise.152 In Ward, the defendant promised to pay the
debt of his father if the plaintiff would not sue the father. But the
plaintiff made no explicit promise not to sue the father. When the
plaintiff sued the defendant in assumpsit and won, the defendant ob-
jected to the Court of Common Pleas that "here there was not any
express mutual agreement because the plaintiff did not undertake di-
rectly that he would not sue [my] father."153 The defendant was
afraid that only he was bound to his guarantee, that the plaintiff
might recover from the defendant and then sue the father, anyway.
But the court apparently understood that serious parties would not
agree to such a thing. Rather than let the defendant off, the court
inferred or implied by law the mutual remedy: "[Tihe acceptance [by
the plaintiffl of the [defendant's] undertaking implies a certain con-
tract and assumpsit on behalf of the plaintiff that he not prosecute"
the father.15 4 The court would rather supply a reciprocal or mutual
remedy than let a serious agreement go unenforced.
Thus, the existence of a mutual remedy remained a goal, at least in
the abstract, for executory agreements.155 The law regarding mutual
promises would be amazing law, would it not, if there should be a per-
fect bargain and only one of the two parties could recover? To be fair,
the law must make available to both parties the same access to the
courts. Baker concludes that one "spiritual source[ ] of the law of con-
sideration" was the "simple, timeless, and ubiquitous moral princi-
ple[ ] that bargains should bind both parties."'5 6 Application of the
affirmative mutuality of remedies doctrine allowed courts to think of
PASTON: Let us go on, then, to the present case.
FoRTEscuE: Willingly. I quite agree that if I buy a horse from you, the
property in the horse is at once mine and therefore you shall have a writ
of debt for the money and I shall have detinue for the horse upon this
bargain. But that is not so in our case, for even if the plaintiffhas a right
to this land in conscience, nevertheless the land will not pass without
livery [and here it would not because the seller had already given livery
to another].
PAsToN: In your case the contract is good without any specialty. And a
good contract must bind both parties. What reason is there, then, why
one should have an action of debt and the other should not have an ac-
tion? (As if to say, there is no reason, since in right he should have the
land.)
It was adjourned.
Id. at 394-95 (emphasis added).
152. Harv. MS 105b, f.23; Harv. MS 1004a, f.48.
153. Harv. MS 105b, f.23.
154. Id.
155. See also H WMLIAM FULBECK, A PARALLELE OR CONFERENCE OF THE CIVIL LAW,
THE CANON LAW, AND THE COAIuON LAW OF THIS REALm OF ENGLAND 18a-b
(1602) [hereinafter, FULBECK, A PARALLELE].
156. BAKER, LEGAL PROFEssION, supra note 8, at 391.
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mutual promises as formally equal on both sides, which is how six-
teenth century courts viewed mutual agreements and how transacting
parties saw themselves. The mutuality of obligation or remedies doc-
trine was a necessary and logical step on the road to seeing mutual
promises as enforceable bargains at all.157
This discussion also suggests a second, related purpose for the mu-
tuality of remedies doctrine. In Ward, the court talked as if the plain-
tiffs acceptance of the defendant's promise created a contract, with a
mutual obligation.i 5 8 The theory behind this holding may have been
similar to an argument made in Reniger v. Fogossai5 9 :
[An agreement concerning personal things is a mutual assent of the parties,
and ought to be executed with a recompence, or else ought to be so certain and
sufficient, as to give an action or other remedy for a recompence: and if it is
not so, then it shall [not] be called an agreement, but rather a nude communi-
cation without effect.1 6 0
Other references to mutual assumpsits as mutual agreements or con-
tracts exist from this time period in reports of common law deci-
sions.1 61 Civilians at this time considered contracts to be firmly
157. I am suggesting only that the mutual promise rule could not have applied fairly
unless the defendant was given an equal chance at recovering from the plaintiff,
not that a counter-promise could not have been valuable and therefore worth bar-
gaining for unless it was enforceable. Ibbetson claims this latter theory in his
argument that the primary theory underlying the early consideration doctrine
was reciprocity:
At first sight the cases of mutual promises are hard to fit into a doctrine
of reciprocity; where promises are actionable independently of each other
it might happen that the defendant be held liable notwithstanding that
he had not in fact received the substantial benefit that had motivated
the making of the promise. So long as the counter-promise was enforcea-
ble, though, it could be argued that this in itself was a benefit which the
defendant had received: the right to performance, although not as good
as actual performance, was itself a thing of value.
Ibbetson, supra note 8, at 86. I respond to Ibbetson's suggestion infra at text
accompanying notes 170-81.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 153-54. The note in the margin of the MS
105b, f.23 report of Ward says, "Acceptance of the assumpsit makes the contract
certain." In this context, "certain" means binding.
159. Plo. 1, 75 Eng. Rep. 1 (1550).
160. Id., Plo. at 5, 75 Eng. Rep. at 7. Ibbetson explains that the English translation of
Plowden omits the word "not" in the final sentence. See Ibbetson, supra note 8, at
104 n.96.
161. Coke in Slade's Case makes a similar statement: "[Tihe mutual executory agree-
ment of both parties imports in itself reciprocal actions upon the case." Slade's
Case, 4 Co. 92b, 94b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1074, 1077 (1602); Penson v. Higbed, 4 Leon.
99, 74 Eng. Rep. 756 (1590) (Wray, J.) (admitting that a "mutual promise and
agreement" "is an assumpsit in law"); 11 FULBECK, A PAPI.LE, supra note 155,
at 18b. For later statements of the same principal, see Ibbetson, supra note 8, at
102-03 (reporting language from Hurford v. Pile, Harv. MS 105f f.2911: "[Elvery
assumpsit is made by the mutual agreement of both parties, and through this
creates a contract as in [Slade's Case], and because of this the person who as-
sumes cannot make a countermand, for a bargain is a bargain ... ."); Opie v.
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grounded in mutual consent.16 2 Though the common law assumpsit
action determined liability by looking at a defendant's promise and
consideration for it, common lawyers seemed willing to claim that
they too were, in assumpsit, enforcing contracts and mutual agree-
ments. 163 Contracts are mutual affairs, between two parties.164
Claiming to enforce contracts through assumpsit is troublesome un-
less there is some mention of the plaintiffs liability as well (or unless
the plaintiff has already performed). The mutuality of obligation doc-
trine served that purpose. It allowed common lawyers to think of mu-
tual promises in terms of contract.
Now, at the end of the twentieth century, the mutuality of reme-
dies or obligations doctrine in this affirmative form is too fundamen-
tal, and perhaps too abstract, to be cited in current litigation, or even
thought about much. But it serves the same purposes now as in the
sixteenth century. Once a court has found assent and mutual
promises, to treat the parties equally and fairly the court should pre-
sumably enforce both promises. Perhaps even more strikingly, our
law has explicitly adopted the reified contract concept. The very idea
of contract may not make sense as applied to mutual promises unless
the mutuality of obligation presumption generally holds. Lawyers to-
day would not call a singly enforceable promise a contract, even if it
were enforceable because it was given in exchange for another prom-
ise. Only when the affirmative mutuality of remedies presumption is
added to the mutual promise rule do mutual promises become the pre-
sumptively binding agreement we call a contract. Thus, in calling mu-
tual, executory promises a contract, we assume that both should be
bound if either is. This is largely what it means for a "contract" to
form if that contract is bilateral and executory-with rights and reme-
dies equal on both sides at least in the abstract. As long as considera-
tion remains a requirement of a contract, and mutual promises
constitute consideration, the mutual remedies rule must bridge the
gap between the mutual promise premise and the contract conclusion.
This necessity of the mutual remedies presumption to the enforce-
ment of wholly executory, mutual promises as contracts means that
the affirmative mutuality of obligation doctrine is relied on daily,
though its use remains unstated. The mutuality of obligation doctrine
operates each time a court finds (or lawyers assume) that both parties
Peters, 2 Keble 837, 84 Eng. Rep. 529, 530 (1671) (Saunders, for the defendant:
"A mutual promise is but the construction of law on a mutual agreement.").
162. See, e.g., I FULBECK, A PARALLELS, supra note 155, at 1; 1H FULBECK, A PAI-
LELE, supra note 155, at 18a-b.
163. H FULBECK, A PARALLELS, supra note 155, at 186 ("[Olur Law requireth in all
contractes a mutuall consideration."); see supra sources cited in notes 158-61.
164. See, e.g., JoHN RASTELL, LES TERMS DE LA LEY 173 (1527), reprinted with English
translation in 1579 (defining contract first as "a bargaine or couenaunt betweene
two parties.").
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to a wholly executory contract are bound, rather than only one of
them, because mutual promises occurred.1 6 5
Common sense and history (though perhaps not strictly the lan-
guage of judicial opinions) show that this affirmative doctrine has con-
tinued to operate only presumptively, as a weak or strong
presumption depending on the judge, the times, and the case at hand.
If good reason exists to enforce only one promise and not the other,
courts depart from the mutuality of obligation doctrine and enforce
only one of two mutual promises. Courts have taken this step in the
cases commonly called "exceptions" to the mutuality of obligation doc-
trine. Both parties are bound unless one is an infant or fraud victim,
was insane at the time, signed under duress, made a promise unen-
forceable under the statute of frauds or violative of some other statute
or public policy, and so on.1 66 In each of these cases, good reason ex-
ists for releasing one party, so the presumptive effect of the mutual
obligation doctrine is overcome. The good reason is a defective prom-
ise or perhaps the fault of the party who caused the defect, or both.
Modern law already talks of binding promises this way, in fact. The
Restatement (Second)'s definition of binding promise is presumptive in
the very way the mutuality of obligation doctrine requires.1 6 7
That the mutuality of obligation doctrine's presumption is over-
come does not destroy its initial force, however. These so-called "ex-
ceptions" to the presumption actually confirm it. Parties are mutually
bound to a wholly executory agreement in the first place in part be-
cause the court can not rationally choose between the parties on the
165. Edwin Patterson hinted at something like the function of mutuality of obligation
described here in his 1958 article, An Apology for Consideration. Patterson said,
"Mhe term 'mutuality' has commonly been applied to the exchange of a promise
for a promise, and means no more than the sufficiency of the proof of promise for
promise in a bilateral contract." Patterson, supra note 2, at 940. Patterson mis-
takenly trivialized the affirmative mutuality of obligation doctrine by assuming
its existence in a "bilateral contract," however. A bilateral contract was impossi-
ble without application of the rule in the first instance.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 104-120.
167. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS defines "Binding Promise" as:
A promise which is a contract is said to be "binding." As the term "con-
tract" is defined, a statement that a promise is binding does not neces-
sarily mean that any particular remedy is available in the event of
breach, or indeed that any remedy is available. Because of the limita-
tions inherent in stating or illustrating rules for the legal relations re-
sulting from promises, it frequently becomes necessary to indicate that a
legal duty to perform arises from the facts stated, assuming the absence
of other facts. In order to avoid the connotation that the duty stated
exists under all circumstances, the word "binding" or a statement that
the promisor is "bound" is used to indicate that the duty arises if the
promisor has full capacity, if there is no illegality or fraud in the transac-
tion, if the duty has not been discharged, and if there are no other simi-
lar facts which would defeat the prima facie duty which is stated.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 cmt. g (1981).
[Vol. 78:491
1999] DEFENSE OF MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATION 527
basis of legal categories the court has used to analyze the transaction.
Thus, when a so-called "exception" applies, that one party remains lia-
ble confirms the mutual remedies presumption in its foundational
form even though the rule is no longer applicable in that case to both
parties. Most commentators have assumed that only declaring the en-
tire contract void would uphold the mutuality of obligation doctrine.
They are correct only if the negative, strong form is the only version of
the rule. But the affirmative, presumptive version of mutuality of ob-
ligation operates prior logically to such "exceptions" and continues to
operate whether the entire contract is declared void or only one party
continues to be bound. So the "exceptions" shed no light on the contin-
uing vitality of the rule. Even though one party is not bound, the
other is still bound on a "contract." The true test of the mutuality of
obligation presumption's vitality would come only if a court held as a
general matter that only one of the two parties is bound in every
wholly executory contract, regardless of whether one promise is void
or unenforceable.168 This is not likely to occur.1 69
I am not suggesting that this view of the mutuality of obligation or
remedies doctrine is "the original understanding." I doubt there was
any clear understanding. Recall that in 1583 two King's Bench judges
were willing to strike down a wager-like contract in Butteye because
only one party could win the wager and thus only one and not both
168. This paragraph responds to those who have argued that the mutuality of obliga-
tion doctrine has been swallowed up by its exceptions. See Oliphant, supra note
1, 28 COLum. L. REv., at 1013; cf Eisenberg, Probability & Chance, supra note 2,
at 1013 ("Once all the necessary qualifications [including that avoidance of or
refusal to enforce one promise does not preclude enforcement of the other] to the
mutuality doctrine have been made, the doctrine is, for practical purposes,
largely a nom de plume for the illusory promise rule.").
169. I wonder why Oliphant, Williston and Corbin never thought of this, particularly
because Williston and Corbin were willing to argue for the doctrine and Williston
cited as the source of the rule Harrison v. Cage, 5 Mod. 411, 87 Eng. Rep. 736
(1698), in which the doctrine was used affirmatively. See supra notes 17, 13641
and accompanying text. Perhaps it is because they all agreed that any answer to
the vitality of the mutuality of obligation rules should come from current case
law, which failed to see the mutuality of obligation doctrine as an affirmative
rule, or as only a presumption. See generally WILIsToN, supra note 9, at 857-59;
Oliphant, supra note 1, 28 CoLum. L. REv., at 997-98 n.2; Corbin, supra note 12,
at 551 ("It can be established only by a collection of decisions in point.... "). Few
if any of the decisions establishing the mutuality of obligation doctrine were
available or well known when these three authorities wrote. Perhaps also they
were far too practical to think of such a pedantic idea as I am suggesting. (As a
boy, I used to move a 10 foot-high pile of sand from place to place in the backyard
using only a pair of tweezers.) Oliphant asked, however, "Is there some well es-
tablished 'principle' in the law of contracts from which the supposed general [mu-
tuality of obligation] rule, that both parties must be bound, follows as a matter of
logical necessity?" See Oliphant, supra note 1, 25 COLuM. L. REv., at 707. I am
answering yes to Oliphant. The principles are the mutual promise rule, basic
fairness, and the meaning of contract.
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parties could have a remedy against the other.1 7o These judges
thought that the absence of a mutual remedy meant that the counter-
promise was not a recompense and therefore not consideration. Ibbet-
son, in arguing that the theory behind the consideration doctrine cen-
tered around reciprocity and exchange, suggests that these judges
understood the rule correctly, that the negative, strong form of the
mutuality of remedies doctrine actually was intended to justify the
mutual promise rule.1i
The negative, strong form mutuality of remedies doctrine does sug-
gest a tie to the reciprocity idea so prevalent in assumpsit rules, and
many judges probably understood the rule as Ibbetson suggests. But
this approach as a historical matter leaves several questions unan-
swered. First, justifying the mutual promise rule by a reciprocal rem-
edy is a circular argument: a counter-promise makes a promise
enforceable only because the counter-promise itself is enforceable, but
the counter-promise is enforceable only if the promise is enforceable,
and so on. This dilemma stumped Holmes, who concluded that "it is a
case of jumping in-call one binding and both are."172 Yet we have no
notice of anyone's recognizing this difficulty at the time the rule was
formulated. Perhaps they didn't see the problem because they didn't
understand the rule the way Holmes did.
Moreover, cases in assumpsit were brought on mutual promises
long before anyone heard of the mutual promise rule, as early as
1518.173 And some judges who were intimately familiar with the mu-
tuality of remedies or obligation doctrine, such as Gawdy, didn't think
it affected enforceability in cases like Butterye. Recall that West v.
Stowelll7 4 (1578), perhaps the first discussion of the mutual promise
170. See supra text accompanying notes 79-85; see also Periam's comments in Fuller's
Case, supra text accompanying note 75.
171. Ibbetson argues that the theory underlying enforcement of promises in assumpsit
was "a bargain model of contract" in which the parties reciprocally traded valua-
ble considerations. He sees the mutuality of remedies doctrine as tying the mu-
tual promise rule to this underlying theory of enforcement:
So long as the counter-promise was enforceable, ... it could be argued
that this in itself was a benefit which the defendant had received: the
right to performance, although not as good as actual performance, was
itself a thing of value.
Ibbetson, supra note 8, at 86.
172. Letter from Holmes to Pollock, 18 Dec. 1910, quoted in Jmuzs GORDLEY, THE
PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DocrINE 174 (1991).
173. See Ibbetson, supra note 8, at 85. No mention of the mutuality of obligation doc-
trine occurs in Lucy v. Walwyn, see BAKER & MILSOM, SOURCES, supra note 8, at
485, or the Inner Temple Moot from Gell's reports, which discusses a case of mu-
tual promises, see id. at 487, or in the arguments in Sharington v. Strotton, 1
Plowden 298, 75 Eng. Rep. 454 (IKB. 1566), reprinted in BAKER & MILSOM,
SOURCES, supra note 8, at 488, which discuss much of the other consideration
doctrine of the time.
174. 2 Leon. 154, 74 Eng. Rep. 437 (C.P. 1577).
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rule in a case report, centered around the meaning of the mutuality of
remedies or obligation rule.175 The early cases thus shed little light
on what the rule means.1 7 6 Probably few lawyers were sure. 177 Even
Ibbetson admits that, if Wray and Ayloffe understood the rule cor-
rectly, the courts as early as Bettisworth (1608) began to abandon that
understanding in favor of "a view that the substance of the considera-
tion was to be found in the promise itself; so long as the promise was of
some value at the time of the initial agreement it was irrelevant that
it was not enforceable at the time of the action."' 7 8 The courts re-
verted to Wray and Ayloffe's position many times thereafter,
however. 179
One should not be surprised if no one was sure what the rule
meant. The consideration rules were just becoming doctrine as a re-
sult of various pleading practices and discussions which occurred in
the fifty or so years beforehand.180 Baker calls consideration's genesis
"the conversion of loose words into jargon."' 8 ' Most likely the mutual-
ity of obligation doctrine as first understood was necessary in the
sense that I have explained it is still necessary, but just how little else
it means has taken 400 years to explicate or decide.
I am suggesting that the mutuality of obligation doctrine is not an
explanation or justification for the mutual promise rule. But mutual-
ity is necessary in the abstract, assuming the existence of the mutual
promise rule, to the mutual promise rule's fair operation and to our
thinking of mutual promises as contracts. Rational (and debatable)
justifications for the mutual promise rule might include an argument
from autonomy,'8 2 or that the rule works to make economic efficiency
more likely 8 3 (though empirical support for this second argument ap-
175. See supra notes 66, 90-93, 146-47 and accompanying text.
176. See supra Part IJ1I.A
177. See BAKER, LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 8, at 383 ("[Tihe opinions of such dis-
tinguished lawyers as Plowden, Keilwey, and Wray, in the third quarter of the
[16th] century, are enough to show that the difficulties then were serious. When
general statements about the effectiveness of mutual promises began to appear in
the books, the explanation of their efficacy was that there were reciprocal reme-
dies. The constant repetition of that proposition in the reports indicates in itself
that it was not altogether digestible."). I suggest the constant repetition arose
from lack of clarity about what the rule meant, not dissatisfaction with the rule's
theory.
178. Ibbetson, supra note 8, at 88.
179. See supra notes 94-101, 110, 112, 117-18 and accompanying text.
180. See BAKER, LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 8, at 369-91; SIMPsoN, supra note 8, at
316-488.
181. BAKER, LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 8, at 391.
182. See CHAMLS FRIED, CoNTRAcr As PROMISE 7-27 (1981); Howard Engelskirchen,
Consideration as the Commitment to Relinquist Autonomy, 27 SETON HALL L.
REv. 490 (1997).
183. See, e.g., MCHAEL J. TREBiCOccK, THE LIuTs OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 164-68
(1993). Trebilcock quotes in turn MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPrrALISm AND FREEDOM
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pears necessary). A mutual promise gives a promisee nothing more
than mere words or moral obligation or perhaps culture-caused expec-
tation or trust-loose justification, perhaps, for saying that by law
mutual promises bind.184 The argument that the mutual promise
binds the promisor because the counter-promise gives the promisor a
reciprocal action against the promisee is hopelessly circular, as
Holmes said. As a justification for the mutual promise rule, the notion
that the promise if performed would be consideration is likewise circu-
lar.185 But if, despite these paradoxes, the law accepts mutual
promises as consideration, the mutuality of obligation doctrine, at
least in its affirmative, presumptive form, must come with it.
13 (1962): "The possibility of coordination through voluntary cooperation rests on
the elementary-yet frequently denied-proposition that both parties to an eco-
nomic transaction benefit from it, provided the transaction is bilaterally volun-
tary and informed."
184. The argument from custom has some historical support. St. Germain held that
contract law followed the jus gentium. See ST. GERsM'S DOCTOR AND STUDENT
133-35, 228 (91 Selden Society, T.F.T. Plucknett & J.L. Barton eds. 1974) (STu-
DENT: "Fyrst it is to be understande that contractes be grounded vpon a custome
of the realme and by the lawe that is called Jus gencium and not dyrectly by the
lawe of reason."). Various historical evidence indicates that mutual informal
promises were enforceable in the Chancery, see W.T. BARBOUR, THE HISTORY OF
CONTRACT IN EARLY ENGLISH EQUITY 16 (Octagon 1974) (1914); at canon law, see
R.H. Helmholz, Assumpsit and Fidei Laesio, in CANON LAw AND THE LAw OF ENG-
LAND 263-90 (1987); and in the borough, fair, and other mercantile courts, see
Baker, The Law Merchant and the Common Law Before 1700, in BAKER, LEGAL
PROFESSION, supra note 8, at 341; 1 BOROUGH CUSTOMS 207-14 (18 Selden Society,
Mary Bateson ed. 1904); 2 BOROUGH CUSTOMS lxxix-lxxxii (21 Selden Society,
Mary Bateson ed. 1906). These sources indicate that promising parties were used
to the idea that informal promises were in many circumstances enforceable. Af-
ter the ecclesiastical courts declined during the reign of Henry VIH and inflation
preempted some local court jurisdictional rules at about the same time, it would
have been natural for plaintiffs to try to bring such cases to the king's courts.
See, e.g., S.F.C. MusoM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF THE COvMnON LAw 315, 333
(2d ed. 1981). Moreover, an increase in the social importance of credit, caused by
the rapidly expanding economy of the late 16th century, pushed royal courts to
take a more active role. See CRAG MULDREW, THE ECONOMY OF OBLIGATION
(1998).
185. Cf Wichals v. Johns, Cro. Eliz. 703, 78 Eng. Rep. 938 (IKB. 1599) (noting while
enforcing mutual promises that not only does the defendant have a cross-action
against the plaintiff but "also the defendant shall be charged as to" the plaintiff,
presumably referring to the defendant's payment to the plaintiff of the judgment
against him that the court proposed to enter in Wichals). No guarantee exists
that any performance will occur. Moreover, the law enforces the promise even
though no performance occurs on either side. Assuming that a performance will
occur from the mere fact of promise is thus no less circular than assuming that
the law will supply an action.
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IV. WHY MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATION HAS
NOTHING TO DO WITH VALUE
The relationship between value and mutuality of obligation im-
pacts two kinds of discussion. First, it impacts discussion by reform-
ers who recently have called for the doctrine of consideration to be
abolished. Part A below relates how these reformers have rallied
around ideologies underlying the so-called "bargain principle" of con-
sideration. These ideologies suggest that the law should not second-
guess economic actors' attempts to promise wisely. The law has for
400 years required some judicial second-guessing, because the consid-
eration doctrine requires an actual exchange of a promise for some
other mutual promise or performance. These reformers would have
the law drop the exchange requirement. In conjunction, these reform-
ers have suggested that the mutuality of obligation doctrine be
dropped. This article's position with respect to mutuality of obligation
is consistent with these reformers' proposals. If the law no longer re-
quires a mutual promise, the need for mutuality of obligation doctrine,
in either negative or affirmative form, will disappear.
Second, the myth that mutuality of obligation is merely an inquiry
into the value or adequacy of consideration has been used as an argu-
ment for abolishing the mutuality of obligation doctrine in a few
courts.1 S6 The Restatement (Second) also cites that argument in sup-
port of its conclusion that mutuality of obligation has been abolished,
and a few courts have listed the Restatement (Second) argument as
authoritative.187 Part B concludes that only the negative version of
the mutuality of obligation doctrine requires an inquiry into adequacy
of consideration. No relationship exists between adequacy or value of
consideration and the affirmative, presumptive mutuality of obliga-
tion doctrine this paper advocates. This paper therefore suggests that
these courts and the Restatement (Second) erroneously discard the
mutuality of obligation doctrine.
A. Consideration Reform and Mutuality of Obligation
The idea that courts should not question contracting parties' sub-
jective determination of the value of consideration is not a new princi-
186. See, e.g., Taliento v. Portland W. Neighborhood Planning Council, 705 A.2d 696,
703 (Me. 1997); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn.
1983); Day v. Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health Ctr., No. 8062, 1983 WL 4934(Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 17, 1983); Berube v. Fashion Ctr., Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1045
(Utah 1989).
187. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 451 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating
that "mutuality of obligation" has been largely rejected as a general principle in
contract law, and citing the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)); Design Benefit Plans, Inc.
v. Enright, 940 F. Supp. 200, 205 (N.D. ]1I. 1996) ("[IThe Restatement (Second) of
Contracts... rejects ... the doctrine of mutuality of obligation .... ").
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ple.188 Recently, the notion has received new emphasis, however.
Focus on the so-called "bargain principle"-that "bargains between ca-
pable and informed actors are [or should be] enforced according to
their terms"-has fueled this trend.1 9 The bargain principle rests in
part on economic assumptions that encourage courts to trust decisions
made by seekers of wealth, either because of courts' respect for their
autonomy or because trusting them is thought to lead under optimal
market conditions to some good for society, such as greater societal
wealth.' 90 The popular understanding of classical economics ap-
188. See, e.g., Eyre v. Potter, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 42, 59-60 (1853) ("[The question of
equivalents or of exact adequacy of consideration cannot well be raised. The par-
ties, if competent to contract and willing to contract, were the only proper judges
of the motive or consideration operating upon them; and it would be productive of
the worst consequences if, under pretexts however specious, interests or disposi-
tions subsequently arising could be made to bear upon acts deliberately per-
formed, and which had become the foundation of important rights in others.");
Smith v. Loring, 2 Hammond 440, 455 (Ohio 1826) ("Inadequacy of consideration
will never avoid a contract, unless it is so gross that fraud will necessarily be
inferred."); THomAs HoBBEs, LEviATHA I.XV.102 ("[Tihe value of all things con-
tracted for, is measured by the Appetite of the Contractors: and therefore the
just value, is that which they be contented to give."); RAsTELL, supra note 164, at
47-48 ("[Blut if any thinge were geuen for the xx.shillinges though it were not but
to the value of a peny, then it had ben a good contracte.").
189. Eisenberg, Probability & Chance, supra note 2, at 1010; Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARv. L. REv. 741 (1982) [hereinafter,
Eisenberg, Bargain Principle]. The principle that courts will not inquire into the
adequacy of consideration is a corollary to it. See id. at 745.
190. See Eisenberg, Probability & Chance, supra note 2, at 1010 (-Ibis principle rests
in large part on the premises that bargains produce gains through trade, that
capable and informed actors are normally the best judges of their own utilities,
and that those utilities are revealed in the terms of the parties' bargain."); Eisen-
berg, Bargain Principle, supra note 189, at 743-47; Eisenberg, Principles, supra
note 2, at 643 ("Exchange creates surplus, because each party presumably values
what he gets more highly than what he gives. A modern free-enterprise system
depends heavily on private planning and on credit transactions that involve ex-
changes over time."); see also TREBICOCK, supra note 183, at 167-68. Of course,
enforcement of the half-executed exchange is justified on grounds of fairness.
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peared to support these assumptions'91 as does the popular under-
standing of neo-classical economics.192
The bargain principle has for centuries influenced the doctrine of
consideration. As originally formulated, the doctrine of consideration
concerned itself generally with reasons for making a promise or for
grounding an action in assumpsit.193 When defined as a good reason
or appropriate circumstance for making a promise, consideration
could (and did) include marriage, detriment, benefit, a return promise,
natural love and affection between immediate family members, a prior
debt, and possession of assets by executors and administrators.19 4
Still, courts as early as the sixteenth century considered reciprocity or
trade to be a paradigmatic reason for making a promise or grounding
an action on a promise.195 Occasionally, and as other forms of consid-
eration declined or were used only in certain more rigid classes of
cases, the courts stretched the reciprocity paradigm to cover remedy-
191. See, e.g., AnD SrrH, AN INQuIRY nTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIoNs 423 (1776), reprinted in HENRY N. BUTLER, EcoNOMIc ANALYSIS FOR
LAWYERs 23 (Carolina 1998).
Every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the
society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to pro-
mote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it....
[B]y directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of
the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in
many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was
in no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that
it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes
that of society more effectually than when he really intends to promote
it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade
for the public good. It is an affectation, indeed, not very common among
merchants, and very few words need to be employed in dissuading them
from it.
1d.
192. See sources cited supra notes 183, 189-90.
193. See PATRICK S. ATYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 143-67
(1979); BAKER, ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 8, at 369-91; SIMPSON, supra
note 8, at 406-88; SPELmA:'s REPORTS, supra note 8, at 286-97. But see Ibbetson,
supra note 8, at 67 (concluding that though the consideration doctrine itself
pointed to these concerns, the theory behind enforcement of promises in assump-
sit focused on the reciprocity of exchanged performances or promised perform-
ances that existed in mutual agreements).
194. These types of consideration are thoroughly discussed, with numerous citations,
by Simpson, see SImPsoN, supra note 8, at 412-45, 459-65, and by the author, see
Val D. Ricks, American Mutual Mistake: Half-Civilian Mongrel, Consideration
Reincarnate, 58 LA. L. Rxv. 663, 696-700.
195. See, e.g., BAKER & MILSOM, SOURCES, supra note 8, at 488 (citing the arguments
of Fletewoode and Wray in Sharington v. Strotton, a 1565 case); Christopher St.
Germain, Doctor and Student (1531), reprinted in BAKER & MZSOM, SOURCES,
supra note 8, at 483 ('And a nude contract is where a man maketh a bargain and
sale of his goods or lands without any recompense appointed for it."); Ibbetson,
supra note 8.
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worthy cases in assumpsit in which no real trade occurred. 196 Consid-
eration as a doctrine was not limited to the reciprocity idea, but the
popularity of the reciprocity paradigm and the principles supporting it
allowed judges sometimes to avoid finding substantive reasons for
making a promise in a case so long as economic motive and the exist-
ence of some formal reciprocity existed.197 On the other hand, courts
have always distrusted their ability to discern motive, so sometimes
consideration analysis focused merely on the reciprocity itself-
whether a thing was bargained-for or is mutually induced.198 This
"bargain principle," which pays little attention to what is bargained
for so long as bargaining is shown, is now taken by many in America
to be the meaning of the consideration doctrine' 99 (though remnants
196. See, e.g., Sturlyn v. Albany, Cro. Eliz. 67, 78 Eng. Rep. 327, (KB. 1587). In Stur-
lyn, the promisor promised to pay on consideration that the promisee show the
promisor a document embodying a legal obligation that the promisor pay. Had
the plaintiffneither done nor promised anything, the plaintiff still could have had
some other remedy, though perhaps for less in damages. The court required a
showing of consideration only so that the action could be brought in assumpsit.
See BAKER, LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 8, at 377; SImPsoN, supra note 8, at
446-48; Ricks, supra note 194, at 699.
197. Sometimes they would even imply the trade when the motive existed. For in-
stance, in Game v. Harvie, Yelv. 51, 51, 80 Eng. Rep. 36, 36 (KB. 1605), the court
found consideration for a promise to repay a loan on demand. The loan appeared
illusory, because the lender could demand it back immediately, but the whole
court, understanding the economic context, held contra: "Popham [J.] said... the
promise is grounded upon an accomodation, viz. a loan, which implies an use of
the [money] by the defendant." Id. The court was willing to imply an obligation
of the creditor to allow the use of the money, and the benefit of using the money
was the consideration. The court took the economic motives of the parties into
account quite explicitly: "[W]hen the intent of the parties may stand with the law,
it shall be expounded accordingly...." Id.
198. Holmes is said to have typified this trend. See FARN SWORTH, supra note 18, § 2.6;
GRA'T GiLMoRE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 19-21 (1974). Holmes gained fame by
stating, "[C]onsideration is a form as much as a seal," and 'The root of the whole
matter is the relation of reciprocal conventional inducement, each for the other,
between consideration and promise." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMS, THE ComhoN
LAw 215, 230 (Howe ed. 1963).
199. See, e.g., Simmons v. California Inst. of Tech., 209 P.2d 581, 586 (Cal. 1949) ("But
the consideration for a promise must be an act or a return promise, bargained for
and given in exchange for the promise."); Panasonic Comma. & Systems Co. v.
State, 691 A.2d 190, 194 (Me. 1997) ("Where there is no bargain... there can be
no consideration."); Baehr v. Penn-O-Tex Oil Corp., 104 N.W.2d 661, 665 (Minn.
1960) ("Consideration requires that a contractual promise be the product of a bar-
gain. However, in this usage, 'bargain' does not mean an exchange of things of
equivalent, or any, value. It means a negotiation resulting in the voluntary as-
sumption of an obligation by one party upon condition of an act or forbearance by
the other. Consideration thus insures that the promise enforced as a contract is
not accidental, casual, or gratuitous, but has been uttered intentionally as the
result of some deliberation, manifested by reciprocal bargaining or negotiation.
In this view, the requirement of consideration is no mere technicality, historical
anachronism, or arbitrary formality. It is an attempt to be as reasonable as we
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of the older rules requiring actual substantive reasons, proof of ra-
tional economic motive, remain20 0 ). Reciprocity itself is thought to
demonstrate economic motive, at least in the form of self-interest. The
economic assumptions underlying the bargain principle thus seem to
warrant enforcement especially when an actual exchange of promise
for promise or performance occurs. Then the opinions and plans of
two self-interested wealth-seekers coincide, and the resulting transac-
tion seems doubly likely to be in the best interests of all.20
As part of this move toward trusting wealth-seekers, courts have
promoted doctrines that seem consistent with leaving the wisdom of
the promise in the hands of the promisor-with subjective valuation of
the thing exchanged in the hands of contracting parties. These doc-
trines include the popular mantras: "[Tihe law does not inquire into
the adequacy of consideration"20 2 and "a peppercorn may constitute a
can in deciding which promises constitute contracts."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CoNTRACTcs § 71 & cmts. (1981).
200. See, e.g., Duncan v. Black, 324 S.W.2d 483, 486-87 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959) (opining
that a disputed claim must be a "discernible mole hill" from which a mountain
might be made before settlement of it may be consideration for a promise to pay
money); Rosyer v. Langdale, Style 248, 82 Eng. Rep. 684 (1650); Peck v. Loveden,
Cro. Eliz. 804, 78 Eng. Rep. 1031 (1602); JOHN WnIIA i SmTH, THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS 182 ('The forbearance to prosecute an action is not a valid consideration
for a promise to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff, unless there be a good cause
of action.").
201. FRIEDMAN, supra note 183, at 13; TREBILCOCK, supra note 183, at 164 ( [P]romises
or commitments made in the course of economic transactions, because of their
supposedly mutually beneficial qualities, are singled out for specially privileged
legal recognition."). A bargain in the classic sense, with each party voluntarily
contributing some performance or promise, is most likely, assuming perfect com-
petition and that the transacting parties are sufficiently informed, to result in
transactions which are Pareto efficient, which means that the transaction bene-
fits one party and either benefits the other or at least makes it no worse off. If
transactions generally are Pareto efficient, then society benefits from the ex-
change because resources are moved to a more efficient use (to those who value
them most highly), where they can be exploited most successfully. As a result of
such transfers, society is best able to maximize its wealth of resources. Perhaps
just as importantly, because neither party is made worse off from the transaction,
the requirement is consistent with contract law's other requirement that parties
to contracts freely assent. Moreover, Pareto efficient transactions are at least fair
in result to both parties, because neither is made worse off through the
transaction.
An autonomy theorist might also posit that a bargain freely made between
two individuals allows both to exercise their freedom to the fullest and also in-
creases their freedom by giving to them the benefits of their cooperation. See
FRIED, supra note 182, at 7-14.
202. See, e.g., Pilarczyk v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 965 F. Supp. 311, 322 (N.D.N.Y.
1997) ('Thus, in the absence of fraud or unconscionability, the adequacy of con-
sideration is not a proper subject of judicial review."); Chicago & A.R. Co. v.
Derkes, 3 N.E. 239, 242 (Ind. 1885) ("The rule is almost elementary that where
parties get all the consideration they bargain for, they cannot be heard to com-
plain of the want or inadequacy of the consideration."); Harford County v. Town
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valuable consideration."20 3 Neither of these rules was created to sup-
port that result.20 4 But by this century courts were citing both as
grounds for reviewing only for sincerity contracting parties' subjective
decisions as to the value of things bargained for.205
Some commentators went further, claiming that the value of the
consideration was irrelevant. These scholars argued that considera-
tion was merely form, much as was a seal, so that if the form of a
bargain appeared as part of the transaction, the promise should be
enforced even though no actual bargain occurred. 20 6 Occasionally
courts speak in ways that suggest they will uphold a mere form of a
bargain,20 7 though it is doubtful that the law has ever gone this far.208
of Bel Air, 704 A.2d 421, 431 (Md. 1998) ("[The Courts of Law ... will not inquire
into the adequacy of the value exacted for the promise so long as it has some
value."); Batsakis v. Demotsis, 226 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) ("Mere
inadequacy of consideration will not void a contract."); King County v. Taxpayers
of King County, 949 P.2d 1260, 1267 (Wash. 1997) ("In assessing consideration,
courts do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration, but employ a legal suffi-
ciency test."); cases cited supra note 3.
203. See, e.g., Leventhal v. New Valley Corp., No. 91 CIV. 4238, 1992 WL 15989, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1992) ("[Slufficient consideration is traditionally found in a pep-
percorn .... ."); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 445 (N.Y. 1982)
("[T]he value or measurability of the thing forborne or promised [as considera-
tion] is not crucial so long as it is acceptable to the promisee. Thus, courts have
not hesitated to find sufficient consideration.., in what is now [known as] the
proverbial peppercorn .... ."); King County v. Taxpayers of King County, 949 P.2d
1260, 1279 (Wash. 1997) ("Even a peppercorn is legally sufficient consideration to
support a promise."); Whitney v. Stearns, 16 Me. 394, 397 (1839) (stating, in an
assumpsit for rent, that "[a] cent or a pepper corn... would constitute a valuable
consideration.").
204. As to the "adequacy of consideration" rule, see GORDLEY, supra note 172, at 147-
48, and SIMPsON, supra note 8, at 445-49. The peppercorn rule originated in Eng-
lish real property law, where a consideration of a peppercorn would validate cer-
tain grants of land. See, e.g., Ince v. Everard, 6 T.R. 545, 547, 101 Eng. Rep. 694
(1796) (Ch. J. Kenyon) ("[T]hat kind of consideration is in many cases inserted for
no purpose whatever, though in others it is of importance, i e. where an estate is
in a trustee and that consideration is inserted to make a deed valid as to him
under the Statute of Uses."); see also Whitney v. Stearns, 16 Me. 394, 397 (1839)
(stating, in an assumpsit for rent, that "A cent or a pepper corn.., would consti-
tute a valuable consideration"). Farnsworth traces it to Blackstone and Coke.
See FARuswoRTH, supra note 18, § 2.11 n.2.
205. See supra notes 202-03.
206. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 84 (1932) ("Consideration is not insufficient
because of the fact... that obtaining it was not the motive or a material cause
inducing the promisor to make the promise. . . ."); id. cmt. b ("[T]he motive or the
cause [of the promise] is immaterial."); HoLEs, supra note 198, at 215
("[C]onsideration is a form as much as a seal."); id. at 230 ("The root of the whole
matter is the relation of reciprocal conventional inducement, each for the other,
between consideration and promise.").
207. See In re Xonics Photochemical, Inc. v. Mitsui & Co., 841 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.
1988) ("Nominal consideration is, in general, all that is needed to satisfy the re-
quirements of the law of contracts.. . ."); GLS Dev., Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
944 F. Supp. 1384, 1395 n.9 (N.D. IM. 1996) ("Nominal consideration is, in gen-
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Some courts held that the form of a bargain, mere nominal considera-
tion, if paid, would uphold an option contract. 20 9 (Probably the diffi-
culty of valuing option contracts contributed to these holdings. An
optionee bets on the value of the optioned property moving up or down
during the option period2 10 ; who else knows what the bet is worth?)
The end of this slippery slide toward trusting promisors surely
ends in abolition of the consideration requirement. If trusting promis-
ors is the law's thrust, then a doctrine appears passe that checks the
reasons promisors may have for promising or even limits promisors'
freedom to bind themselves consensually.
Courts jumped off the slide before they hit bottom, however.
Though courts have applied consideration doctrine with a more bar-
gain-process-focused attitude, they retain the form of law set out in
the late sixteenth century. This point is crucial to the life of the mutu-
ality of obligation doctrine, because with other doctrines the law re-
tains the mutual promise rule. While the relevance of the
eral, all that is needed to satisfy the requirements of the law of contracts.&"); Wei-
ner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 445 (N.Y. 1982) ("Far from
consideration needing to be coextensive or even proportionate, the value or mea-
surability of the thing forborne or promised is not crucial so long as it is accepta-
ble to the promisee. Thus, courts have not hesitated to find sufficient
consideration... in what is now the proverbial peppercorn .... ."); accord RE-
STATEMENT OF CoNrRAcTs § 84 cmt. b (1932) ("[The motive or the cause is imma-
terial."); id. § 84 illus. 1 (declaring enforceable a promise to convey a property
worth $5000 in consideration for payment of one dollar).
208. Even the example the first RESTATEMENT used to illustrate that motive was irrel-
evant displayed a clear inducement and motive for the promise:
A wishes to make a binding promise to his son B to convey to B Black-
acre, which is worth $5000. Being advised that a gratuitous promise is
not binding, A writes to B an offer to sell Blackacre for $1. B accepts. B's
promise to pay $1 is sufficient consideration.
RESTATE~MENT OF CoNTRaCTS § 84 cmt. b, illus. 1. A wants to give land to his son.
The law once might have enforced this for what it is, a promise made for love and
affection. See, e.g., SnMPsoN, supra note 8, at 434-37; Ricks, supra note 194, at
696 n.161 (discussing love and affection as consideration).
209. See Wheat v. Morse, 17 Cal. Rptr. 226 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961) (upholding an option
given in consideration of $1); Real Estate Co. of Pittsburgh v. Rudolph, 153 A. 438
(Pa. 1930). Some courts do not require actual payment, but only a recital. See
Smith v. Wheeler, 210 S.E.2d 702 (Ga. 1974); Real Estate Co. of Pittsburgh, 153
A. at 439. These decisions often infer a promise to pay from a recital of payment,
see Smith, 210 S.E.2d at 703, or hold that the optionor is estopped by the recital
to deny payment of consideration, see Real Estate Co. of Pittsburgh, 153 A. at 439-
40.
210. See Marsh v. Lott, 97 P. 163, 165 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1908) ("[N]o standard exists
whereby to determine the adequate value of an option to purchase specific real
estate. The land has a market value susceptible of ascertainment, but the value
of an option upon a piece of real estate might, and oftentimes does, depend upon
proposed or possible improvements in the particular vicinity.").
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consideration doctrine has declined as a policeman of agreements, 21 1
it still places at least three important limitations on promisors' free-
dom to value what they receive in return for a binding promise:
(1) The promisor must subjectively believe the consideration is val-
uable. This conclusion follows from the law's requirement that the
consideration be bargained-for, or mutually induced. To induce, a
thing must have some subjective value in the mind of the person
induced.
(2) The promisor's belief that the consideration is valuable must
have some basis in rationality; no promisor could rationally believe
valuable something that can have no value. This rule follows from the
notion that the bargain or inducement must not be a mere pretense:
Claims to subjective value fail as a factual matter when they can not
be understood or believed by the trier of fact.
(3) The law requires an actual return performance or promise
(meaning a promise of some actual performance). This limitation ex-
cludes mere probabilities of return promises or performances. In the
mutual promise context, courts often imply the substance of this limi-
tation by saying that a promise is consideration only if the promised
performance would itself also be consideration;212 courts recognize
that promises are not induced by another's mouthing a return promise
but by the expectation of actual performance of that promise. The illu-
sory promise rule assumes a similar substantive limitation on mutual
promises by requiring that the counter-promise actually name a fu-
ture performance and not the mere possibility of one.213
These limitations on promisors' subjective valuation never require
in their operation that a court overtly determine the value of a consid-
eration. The first two merely require that the subjective value be sin-
cerely asserted and not irrational. This limitation may be phrased as
a factual conclusion formally unrelated to value (i.e.: "you were not
actually induced by this; you are lying" or "this thing could not have
been an inducement; this thing was merely nominal"). The third is a
400 year-old limitation on what can count as consideration, and is old
211. Of course, other doctrines police the equality of bargains, most notably unconscio-
nability but also fraud, mutual mistake, see Ricks, supra note 194, at 668-71, and
economic duress, see RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRACrs § 176(2) (1981).
212. See Software Clearing House, Inc. v. Intrak, Inc., 583 N.E.2d 1056, 1064 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1990) ("The mere utterance of a promise does not supply the actual con-
sideration for the bargain. Rather, '[ilt is the content of the promise or the actual
anticipated performance which supplies consideration for the bargain.'" (Internal
citations omitted.)); RESTATE MENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 75 (1981) ("[A]
promise which is bargained for is consideration if, but only if, the promised per-
formance would be consideration."); FRNsswORTH, supra note 18, § 2.4; CAsL11AP
& PEiuLLO, supra note 9, at 200.
213. For a discussion of the illusory promise rule, see supra text accompanying notes
19-31.
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enough that no court justifies it. However, a value determination is
inherent in all of these limitations: in the first two because the ability
to say what rationally may be valued puts outside limits on the par-
ties' subjective choice, and in the third because the requirement of an
actual performance or promise prevents supposedly more risky catego-
ries of return (such as probabilities) from becoming the inducement
that makes a promise enforceable.
Some commentators would have the law depart from this sixteenth
century form to reflect more closely the economic theories which sup-
port the bargain principle. If autonomy principles encourage courts to
trust promisors, then all voluntary promises ought to be presump-
tively enforceable. 21 4 If greater wealth or greater good to society re-
sults from promises made by seekers of wealth freely and upon
adequate information in a competitive market, then enforcement of all
such promises should result in greater wealth, and should be en-
couraged.2 15 If serious promises made by free actors were enforced on
these bases, the requirement of a return promise or performance, an
actual bargain, would become unnecessary. 2 16
In a majority of serious promise cases an actual bargain exists in
practice, because economic actors do not often bind themselves with-
out at least a reciprocal promise of some economic return. But also
sometimes assets are invested, and promises made, with no reciprocal
promise of or actual economic return. Investors in stock, for instance,
might promise to pay for such securities without even a promise of
return; only a potential or probability of return exists. Everyone
agrees that a promise given in exchange for actual securities is en-
forceable. Analogizing from cases such as this, consideration reform-
ers suggest that rational probability of return, or that the promise
rationally be thought to facilitate exchange, be the test for enforce-
214. See FRIED, supra note 182, at 12 ("To have force in a particular case promises
must be assumed to have force generally. Once that general assumption is made,
the effects we intentionally produce by a particular promise may be morally at-
tributed to us.").
215. As supporting this hypothesis, I suggest Professors Barnett, Craswell, Eisenberg,
Farber & Matheson, Gordon, and Wessman. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 518;
Craswell, supra note 2, at 490-91, 497-99; Eisenberg, Probability & Chance,
supra note 2, at 1005; Farber & Matheson, supra note 2, at 903; Gordon, Com-
mercial-Gift, supra note 2, at 293; Gordon, Dialogue, supra note 2, at 987; Wess-
man, Consideration I, supra note 2, at 45.
216. Accordingly, Barnett, Farber & Matheson, Gordon, and Wessman recommend
that consideration doctrine be abolished for promises made in these circum-
stances. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 2, at 945; Barnett, supra note 2, at
529-32 (adopting Farber & Matheson's position); Gordon, Commercial-Gift, supra
note 2, at 286-87, 290-91 (recommending that the consideration requirement be
abolished in commercial transactions); Wessman, Consideration I, supra note 2,
at 115-16 (recommending enforcement "[elven if it is not a bargain"). Craswell
treats it as irrelevant. Craswell, supra note 2, at 497-99.
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ment. They would drop the requirement of an actual return promise
or performance and instead focus on economic motive.2 1 7 These com-
mentators would enforce, for instance, potential seller Sally's promise
to maintain a low price for a certain time period, so long as potential
buyer Bob assented to Sally's proposal by acknowledging it.21i These
commentators would enforce Sally's promise even though Bob actually
gives neither a promise nor performance in exchange, because of their
respect for Sally's autonomy or the economic assumptions underlying
the bargain principle. 219
If the reforms suggested by these commentators were accom-
plished, the mutual promise rule would be abrogated; a bargain-a
return promise or performance-would no longer be required. Virtu-
ally all bargain promises are designed to encourage a rational
probability of return or to facilitate exchange, to induce another to ac-
tion. (That is what "mutual inducement" means, less the requirement
of an actual return promise or performance, the third limitation on the
parties' ability to bind themselves through their subjective valuations
of things bargained for.) If the law begins to allow a probability of
return to function as consideration, as an inducement on which to
ground an action on a promise, then all promises meant to induce or
make probable economic action in response are enforceable. The mu-
tual promise rule would be superfluous.
217. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 529; Eisenberg, Probability & Chance, supra note 2,
at 1005; Farber & Matheson, supra note 2, at 925-38; Gordon, Commercial-Gift,
supra note 2, at 286-87, 290-91; Wessman, Consideration I, supra note 2, at 45,
115-16.
218. Barnett, Craswell, Eisenberg, Farber & Matheson, Gordon, and Wessman sug-
gest Sally should be bound here. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 529-32; CrasweU,
supra note 2, at 497-98; Eisenberg, Probability & Chance, supra note 2, at 1020-
24; Farber & Matheson, supra note 2, at 925-34; Gordon, Commercial-Gift, supra
note 2, at 290-91; Wessman Consideration I, supra note 2, at 115-16. These com-
mentators might argue such a transaction would likely be Pareto efficient be-
cause Sally would make no such promise unless Sally perceived a benefit to
accrue to her as a result. Moreover, Sally obtains a benefit, the increased
probability of transacting with Bob. And Bob suffers no or very minimal cost by
acknowledging Sally's promise. Bob is made no worse off by the transaction (es-
pecially if the agreement is enforced, but even if not), and perhaps gains a benefit
because Bob then may have the option of calling on Sally to supply at the price
offered. Thus, Pareto efficiency appears possible even without Bob's assent.
219. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 529-32; Craswell, supra note 2, at 497-99 ("[Wlhen
the motive for commitment is to induce an efficient level of reliance, the commit-
ment need not be mutual."); Eisenberg, Probability & Chance, supra note 2, at
1010-11 (recommending enforcement even in the absence of a classical bargain);
Farber & Matheson, supra note 2, at 945 (recommending enforcement "without
regard to the presence of consideration or reliance"); Gordon, Commercial-Gift,
supra note 2, at 286-87, 290-91 (recommending that the consideration require-
ment be abolished in commercial transactions); Wessman, Consideration I, supra
note 2, at 115-16 (recommending enforcement "[e]ven if it is not a bargain").
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If courts never asked whether a mutual promise exists, the law
would no longer need to hold that in such circumstances both should
be bound, or neither, absent good reason. Thus, the mutuality of rem-
edies or obligation doctrine would likewise become superfluous. One
party could be bound without the other on the theory promoted by
these reformers. It is thus not surprising to find that many of these
commentators recommend that the mutuality of obligation doctrine as
well as the consideration doctrine be abrogated.2 2 0
I do not discuss in this paper whether this reform of consideration
would be appropriate. 22 ' I wish to note, however, that the position
taken by this paper is mainly consistent with these proposals. This
paper does not advocate that the consideration doctrine be retained.
It proposes only that, until it is overruled, the mutuality of obligation
doctrine must remain viable. Though some courts seem to have
dropped the requirement of a reciprocal promise or performance in
certain narrow classes of cases,2 22 in the vast majority, courts still ap-
pear to require a return promise or performance. 2 23 As long as they
do, they must retain the mutuality of obligation doctrine.
B. Why Courts and the Restatement (Second) Tried to
Overrule Mutuality of Obligation
As noted, some lines of case law demonstrate that the ideas es-
poused by the commentators just discussed have carried weight with
220. See e.g., Barnett, supra note 2, at 529-36; Farber & Matheson, supra note 2, at
929-34; Gordon, Commercial-Gift, supra note 2, at 283,290-92,306-07; Wessman,
Consideration II, supra note 2, at 713; Wessman, Consideration I, supra note 2,
at 45.
221. Perhaps we are now confident enough in our economic principles actually to enact
them into law. Whether the actual success of those principles should be the goal
of contract law is another matter. Trebilcock, for instance, notes:
[Welfare-based theories of promise-keeping pose their own set of inde-
terminacies. That is, if the objective of legal rules in this context is max-
imizing the net social benefits of promissory activity-the benefits of the
promises minus their costs-or regulation promises so as to maximize
the net beneficial reliance derived from promise-making activity, difficul-
ties arise in determining which legal sanctions optimize the interactions
between promisor and promisee and minimize precaution costs for both
parties.
TPEBMCOCK, supra note 183, at 184-85. But see Craswell, supra note 2, at 501-02
(responding to the argument that courts do not have the ability to judge effi-
ciency). But whether courts can determine efficiency or not, requiring courts to
focus on actual economic or other guiding principles would be a vast improvement
over their current discussions of doctrines such as consideration that reflected a
muddled hodge-podge of rationales when they were invented and remain mud-
died now.
222. See cases cited infra note 224 and various promissory estoppel cases cited in Far-
ber & Matheson, supra note 2, at 903.
223. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 6, 9, 64.
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courts as well. 224 In some of these cases, the economic assumptions
underlying the bargain principle encourage enforcement of a promise
but for the defect that no return performance or promise exists. One
such situation occurs when an employer publishes an employee hand-
book promising job security or a disciplinary procedure but leaving the
employee free to quit at any time. In such cases, some courts have
dropped the consideration doctrine explicitly and entirely, as the com-
mentators would suggest. Consider the following from Toussaint v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan (1980).225
224. Many of these cases involve employers' promises to employees, such as (1)
promises for stock options, see Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731, 735 (Del. Super. Ct.
1960) (analyzing the validity of a promise for stock options on the basis of future
benefits the corporation might obtain); Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 A.2d 384, 388
(Del. Ch. 1997) ("[The consideration for stock options is often the reasonable
prospect of obtaining the employee's valued future services."); or (2) promises for
job security, see Murphy v. Birchtree Dental, P.C., 964 F. Supp. 245, 247-50 (E.D.
Mich. 1997); In re Certified Question, 443 N.W.2d 112 (Mich. 1989); Toussaint v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980); Hetes v.
Schefinan & Miller Law Office, 393 N.W.2d 577, 578 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); Dam-
row v. Thumb Coop. Terminal, Inc., 337 N.W.2d 338, 342-43 (Mich. Ct. App.
1983). But this movement is not limited to employment contexts. See, e.g., Arrow
Indus. v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 767 P.2d 935 (Utah 1988) (including the "good
will flowing from" certain promises as well as other benefits in its consideration
analysis). Some prize cases also seem to adopt a similar theory. See Society The-
ater v. City of Seattle, 203 P. 21, 22 (Wash. 1922) (Ihe fact that prizes of more or
less value are to be distributed will attract persons to the theaters who would not
otherwise attend. In this manner those obtaining prizes pay consideration for
them, and the theaters reap a direct financial benefit."). A variety of ways to
account for enforcement of advertising games is discussed in Mark B. Wessman,
Is "Contract" the Name of the Game: Promotional Games as Test Cases for Con-
tract Theory, 34 ARiz. L. Rav. 635 (1992). Traces of this kind of thinking about
promises is, of course, found throughout the history of contract law. Cf Wild v.
Harris, 7 C.B. 999 (1849) (married man's promise to marry after a reasonable
time held valid consideration for woman plaintiffs promise to marry him because
his wife might die during the reasonable time; the possibility of marriage was
counted a consideration).
225. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980),
was such a case. Toussaint was a middle manager at Blue Cross. When he was
hired, Toussaint was told he would be employed as long as he did his job. See id.
at 884 n.5. In addition, a Blue Cross employee handbook stated a disciplinary
procedure and a policy that Blue Cross would fire employees 'for just cause only."
Id. at 884. After Blue Cross fired Toussaint with no disciplinary procedure and
no explanation, Toussaint sued. Blue Cross objected that, because Toussaint was
free to leave at any time, any promise made by the bank lacked mutuality. See
id. at 885. There was apparently no evidence in the record that Toussaint relied
on the handbook. See id. Nor did the court rely on that fact. Instead, the court
grounded Blue Cross's contractual obligation to Toussaint on the probability that
Blue Cross's handbook policy would generate an economic return. See id. at 892;
see also id. at 895 ("Having announced the policy, presumably with a view to
obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved
quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory.").
The majority opinion does not discuss Blue Cross's mutuality objection, but this
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While an employer need not establish personnel policies or practices, where
an employer chooses to establish such policies and practices and makes them
known to its employees, the employment relationship is presumably en-
hanced. The employer secures an orderly, cooperative and loyal work force,
and the employee the peace of mind associated with job security and the con-
viction that he will be treated fairly. No pre-employment negotiations need
take place and the parties' minds need not meet on the subject; nor does it
matter that the employee knows nothing of the particulars of the employer's
policies and practices or that the employer may change them unilaterally. It is
enough that the employer chooses, presumably in its own interest, to create
an environment in which the employee believes that, whatever the personnel
policies and practices, they are established and official at any given time, pur-
port to be fair, and are applied consistently and uniformly to each employee.
The employer has then created a situation "instinct with an obligation."2 2 6
In other words, the mere probability of the employer's economic ad-
vance was sufficient benefit to the employer to ground the employee's
action for breach of promise, even without traditional consideration or
even a return acknowledgment of assent from the employee. Under
such an analysis, there is no need for any reciprocal performance or
promise and consequently no need for any reciprocal remedy or mutu-
ality of obligation doctrine. 227
Others courts have explicitly declined to drop the consideration re-
quirement, however:
The employee handbook was not distributed until about two years after [the
employee] was hired. It constituted a unilateral statement of company poli-
cies and procedures. Its terms were not bargained for, and there was no meet-
ing of the minds. The policies may be changed unilaterally at any time. The
employee handbook was not a part of [the] employment contract at the time
she was hired, nor could it have been a modification to her contract because
there was no new and independent consideration for its terms. 2 2 8
Still others, such as Pine River State Bank v. Mettille,2 29 purport to
find consideration but are confused by the mutuality of obligation is-
sue. Mettille found consideration in the employee's return perform-
ance: "[Tihe consideration here . . . is Mettille's continued [job]
rationale dispenses with the need for it. Indeed, this rationale dispenses with the
need for consideration at all and rests solely on the economic principles support-
ing the bargain principle. The employee's assent is not even necessary. A concur-
ring opinion in the case based consideration on Toussaint's actual performance,
as if the offer of job security were a unilateral promise requesting that Toussaint
accept by beginning work for Blue Cross. See id. at 899-900 (Ryan, J., concur-
ring). Still, Toussaint would remain free to leave. The concurrence viewed this
case as a textbook example of unilateral contract: Toussaint is to give Blue Cross
a chance to show it's a good employer in exchange for a promise of job security.
226. Id. at 892.
227. Accordingly, several commentators have recommended in conjunction with pro-
moting the enforcement of promises meant to encourage exchange that the con-
sideration doctrine itself be abrogated. See supra Part ElLA.
228. Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063, 1066 (Mont. 1982) (granting
relief to the employee on other legal grounds factually based on the promulgation
of the handbook).
229. 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
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performance despite his freedom to leave."2 30 In essence, Mettille
characterized the handbook as a unilateral contract, the bank promis-
ing to perform according to the handbook if Mettille gave the bank a
chance to show what a fine employer it was by continuing to come to
work for a period.2 31 The mutuality of obligation doctrine is irrelevant
to such an agreement, as noted, because no need exists for a mutual
remedy. 23 2 The court, however, unnecessarily purported to overrule
the doctrine of mutuality as an inquiry into adequacy of consideration:
[Another] argument is that job security provisions lack enforceability because
mutuality of obligation is lacking. Since under a contract of indefinite dura-
tion the employee remains free to go elsewhere, why should the employer be
bound to its promise not to terminate unless for cause or unless certain proce-
dures are followed? The demand for mutuality of obligation, although appeal-
ing in its symmetry, is simply a species of the forbidden inquiry into adequacy
of consideration .... 233
What the Mettille court meant by "mutuality of obligation" under
this paragraph is far from clear. Several meanings are consistent
with the passage. One is that the court thought mutuality required
equivalence of exchange. It does not,2 34 so overruling some general
notion of equivalence would not overrule mutuality. If general equiva-
lence of exchange is what the court meant to overrule, it overruled a
red herring.
The Mettille court might have meant the minimal equivalence re-
quired by the mutual promise rule, namely, that a promise occur on
both sides (though a performance on one side should suffice, and the
230. Id. at 629.
231. This unilateral contracts approach to employer statements regarding job security
has become fairly regular. See, e.g., Deborah A. Schmedemann & Judi McLean
Parks, Contract Formation and Employee Handbooks: Legal, Psychological, and
Empirical Analyses, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 647 (1994); see also generally Mark
Pettit, Jr., Modern Unilateral Contracts, 63 B.U. L. REv. 551 (1983). Farber &
Matheson argue that the unilateral contract analysis in Mettille was disingenu-
ous, a cover-up for dropping the consideration requirement entirely in favor en-
forcing a promise made in furtherance of economic activity. See Farber &
Matheson, supra note 2, at 920-22 ([T]he change in terms is not bargained for
and does not require any additional commitment from or detriment to them.").
Their point is valid, though the Toussaint analysis, see supra notes 224-26, and
accompanying text, is a better example of the kind of rule Farber & Matheson
advocate. Eisenberg has recently noted the somewhat economically transparent
distinction between unilateral contracts in which the promisor seeks to induce
another to give it a chance and the kind of structural arrangement enforced as
such in Toussaint. See Eisenberg, Probability & Chance, supra note 2, at 1012-
18, 1020-23.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 6-7, 142-43.
233. Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629 (Minn. 1983).
234. Even recent treatises recognize that mutuality of obligation has not meant equiv-
alence as a general matter. See, e.g., PERILo & BENDER, supra note 2, § 6.1
(omitting discussion of this potential meaning of mutuality of obligation); 2 Wa-
LISTON, supra note 9, §§ 7:13, 7:15.
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court eventually held that one did suffice). The requirement of a
promise entails that some objective value be given, because a promise
seems to be more valuable in the abstract than an expectation without
a promise.2 35 Inasmuch as the mutual promise doctrine requires such
"equivalence," and the illusory promise doctrine ensures that substan-
tive promises occur, the illusory promise doctrine and hence mutuality
of obligation can be said to ensure equivalence.
But such an equivalence requirement is minimal in the extreme.
One party might promise a "peppercorn" and the other Fort Knox, as
long as both promises are bargained-for. Most expectations generated
from promises seriously intended to facilitate exchange, such as by
Sally's promise to supply mentioned above,2 36 are worth more than a
promise of a peppercorn. Promises reasonably made to facilitate ex-
change thus may often result in closer equivalence than the mutual
promise rule ensures. Further, later evidence of Minnesota decisions
indicates that the Mettille court did not mean to overrule the equiva-
lence required by the mutual promise rule. The court that decided
Mettille still entertains illusory promise arguments, 2 37 and its
subordinate courts have since decided cases on illusory promise
grounds.2 38 The Mettille court apparently did not overrule the mutual
promise rule nor the illusory promise rule.
Did the Mettille court overrule the mutuality of obligation doctrine
itself? It is possible that the Mettille court failed to perceive that the
mutuality of obligation doctrine is only an affirmative presumption of
equal remedies meant to ensure basic fairness. Instead, the court
might have interpreted the rule in its negative form, as a strict condi-
tion that a promise to be consideration must be binding. As I have
noted, this view has support in some prior case law. Two judges in
Butterye v. Goodman239 (1583) appear to have taken the same view,
for instance.2 40
If one takes this view, then the notion that the mutuality of obliga-
tion doctrine encroaches on the subjective value judgments of the par-
ties appears unavoidable. As noted, the only objective limitations on
the parties' ability to value consideration subjectively are that their
valuation have some rational basis and that consideration consist in a
235. A bird in the bush is worth two in the air?
236. See supra text accompanying notes 218-19.
237. In re Welfare of D.D.G., 558 N.W.2d 481, 484-85 (Minn. 1997) (discussing the
illusory promise doctrine without mentioning that it is overruled).
238. O'Connor v. State, No. C6-97-1310, 1998 WL 27241 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 27,
1998) (unpublished opinion); O'Connor v. Board of Trustees of Minnesota State
Colleges, No. C1-95-2294, 1996 WL 192976 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 1996) ("Illu-
sory promises cannot establish an enforceable contract.") (unpublished opinion).
239. BAKER, LEGAL PROFEssION, supra note 8, at 382-83.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 79-83.
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promise or performance. 24 ' An unenforceable promise is at least a
promise and can rationally be thought valuable. Stated another way,
contracting parties do not bargain for a legal obligation but only for a
return promise, as Oliphant said in 1928.242 Therefore, any addi-
tional requirement that a promise be legally binding adds an addi-
tional layer of objective limitation on the parties' subjective valuation
of the promise, an additional layer beyond the requirement of an ac-
tual, two-sided bargain.
Probably this is what the Restatement (Second) authors intended to
say in comment a of section 78, intended as a justification for overrul-
ing the mutuality of obligation doctrine:
The value of a promise depends on its terms and on the probability that it will
be performed. The value [of a promise] is not necessarily affected adversely by
the fact that no legal remedy will be available in the event of breach; the
probability of performance may be greater for a voidable or unenforceable
promise, or even for a promise which is not binding or is against public policy,
than for the judgment or decree of a court. In general the law of contracts
leaves to the parties the valuation of a promise in the formation of a bargain.
The fact that no legal remedy is available for breach of a promise does not
prevent it from being a part of a bargain or remove the bargain from the scope
of the general principle that bargains are enforceable. 2 43
This passage says in effect only that it is rational for the parties to
bargain for an unenforceable promise. It is true that the language of
the first two sentences gives objective criteria for judging value. These
sentences are intended not to give a trier of fact a means of judging
objective value and imposing it on the parties, however, but to justify
to a court a party's subjective judgment that an unenforceable promise
is valuable, in hope that the court will allow that subjective valuation
to stand. (Any other reading of this comment would place the first two
sentences in conflict with the third.)
The proper response to the argument in Mettille and the Restate-
ment (Second) is that it reads too much into the mutuality of obliga-
tion doctrine. Given the rule's history, no one can now reasonably
argue that the rule (i) (a) functions negatively to strip from a recipro-
cal promise its status as consideration or (b) holds in all contexts more
than presumptively, and (ii) thus constitutes an additional limitation
on the ability of parties to value consideration subjectively. Quite to
the contrary, the rule has operated for four centuries only as an af-
firmative, only to ensure that both sides of an agreement to extend
credit, to trust each other's promises, are presumptively enforced, as a
241. See supra text accompanying notes 211-13.
242. See Oliphant, supra note 1, 25 COLuM. L. REv., at 720 ("To say that the ordinary
layman, making an offer for a bilateral contract, always or usually bargains for a
legal obligation, is false."). But cf. WMLISTON, supra note 9, at 865-68 (arguing
that legal obligation is the meaning of "legal value" of consideration, which must
be present in addition to a factual bargain).
243. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 78 cmt. a (1981).
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bargain or contract. The mutuality of obligations principle thus en-
sures fairness and equality in the law, not additional objective value
on both sides. Moreover, the doctrine operates as a presumption. It
follows that if Mettille and the Restatement (Second) intended to re-
peal the mutuality of obligation doctrine as an inquiry into value, they
have thrown out the fairness and equity baby with the value-carrying
bath water.244
For these reasons, I suggest that Mettille is incorrect in its holding
relative to mutuality of obligation. The Mettille court itself has shown
that it did not mean to overrule the mutual promise or illusory prom-
ise doctrine. 245 And if Mettille meant to overrule the mutuality of ob-
ligation doctrine itself, its rationale for doing so misses the point. The
Restatement (Second)'s opinion on the mutuality of obligation doctrine
suffers from the same malady. It's value-related rationale for dis-
missing the mutuality of obligation doctrine provides no ground for
repealing the rule as properly understood. Moreover, even if Mettille
and the Restatement (Second) intend this result for the negative,
strong form version of mutuality of obligation, still the affirmative,
presumptive version must hold or the connection between mutual
promises and contract will be severed.
V. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of consideration and its corollary mutuality of obliga-
tion stand or fall together. If courts and commentators advocate aban-
donment of mutuality of obligation, they must also advocate
abandoning the rule that mutual or bargained-for promises show a
consideration or the more general notion that consideration is re-
quired. While consideration remains a requirement and consideration
may be a mutual promise, the law must leave room for mutuality of
obligation. Unless the law is willing to enforce arbitrarily one of the
mutual promises to which parties have assented and not the other, it
must be prepared to retain the mutuality of obligation doctrine at
least in an affirmative, presumptive form.
244. It is possible, given Mettille's holding that the employee gave consideration for
the employer's promise by continuing to perform, that the Mettille court may
have intended to overrule application of the doctrine of mutuality of obligation to
unilateral contracts. This reading is less clear from the passage in the case.
Such a holding would also overrule a red herring. Neither the illusory promise
nor the mutuality of obligation doctrine has ever properly applied to unilateral
contracts, and courts have been saying so for generations. See, e.g., Wellington v.
Apthorp, 13 N.E. 10, 12 (Mass. 1887) ([I]fA. promises to B. to pay him a sum of
money if he will do a particular act, and B. does the act, the promise thereupon
becomes binding, although B., at the time of the promise, does not engage to do
the act," and "the person to whom the promise is made is under no mutual, bind-
ing obligation on his part." (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
245. See supra notes 236-38.
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Corbin said in 1926 that some had "urged... that the time has
come to abandon the requirement of a consideration; but the existing
decisions show that the courts would not now follow such a rule."24 6
Perhaps it is time to try again, but in the meantime courts should be
hesitant to toss aside the wisdom of ages past. Once lawyers forget
their legal roots, they often feel free to cite any number of things
Holmes said in support of overruling what their ancestors did.247
Courts have no need to be hasty about overruling mutuality of obliga-
tion, however. It sits on solid ground. Coke2 48 called the common law
of his day, the day which generated the mutuality of obligation doc-
trine, an
artificial perfection of reason... by many successions of ages... fined and
refined by an infinite number of grave and learned men, and by long experi-
ence grown to such a perfection, for the government of this realm, as the old
rule may be justly verified of it ... : No man out of his own private reason
ought to be wiser than the law, which is the perfection of reason.2 4 9
246. Corbin, supra note 12, at 556.
247. Holmes stated:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the
rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)
(Holmes could really turn a phrase). Consider also:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intu-
itions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which
judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do
than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be
governed.
HoLm~s, supra note 198, at 5.
248. Edward Coke (1552-1634) was a law student in the mid-1570s, when the mutual
promise rule may have been first explicated. He was called to the bar in April
1578, and practiced successfully throughout the 1580s. His formulation of the
doctrine of consideration in Stone v. Wythipoole, 78 Eng. Rep. 383 (K.B. 1587)
(benefit to the promisor or detriment to the promisee), if it was his, which I doubt,
withstood reformulation until this century. Coke became solicitor-general in
1592, speaker of the House of Commons the same year, attorney-general in 1593,
chiefjustice of the Common Pleas in 1606, and chiefjustice of the King's Bench in
1613. King James removed him from the King's Bench in 1616. In his later
years, he served in parliament. He left his case law Reports in 12 volumes, many
of which he prepared for publication during his lifetime. He also left his Insti-
tutes, four treatises of various sorts, two of which he prepared for publication
during his lifetime, and his commentary on Littleton's land law treatise. A great
deal has been written and continues to be written of Coke. See e.g., Baker, Coke's
Note-Books and the Sources of His Reports, in BAKER, LEGAL PROFESSION, supra
note 8, at 177; , Baker, New Light on Slade's Case, in BAKER, LEGAL PROFESSION,
supra note 8, at 393; Allen D. Boyer, "Understanding, Authority, and Will": Sir
Edward Coke and the Elizabethan Origins of Judicial Review, 39 B.C. L. REv. 43
(1997).
249. COKE ON Lrrr. 97b (1628).
[Vol. 78:491
1999] DEFENSE OF MUTUALITY OF OBLIGATION 549
Coke probably overstates his position,250 but one would not expect
Coke's infinite number of grave and learned men to create a mere
"shibboleth," a useless, "counterproductive" "tautology," as one com-
mentator has called mutuality of obligation.2 51 And indeed, they did
not.
250. Coke was known for overstatement. See, e.g., Boyer, supra note 248, at 43.
251. MuRRAY, supra note 2, at 250.
